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Abstract 
 
This research report examines news media representation of political leadership and 
governance in South Africa between 2007 and 2013, when President Jacob Zuma 
served his first terms as ANC leader and later as the head of state. The research 
sought to find out what themes and ideas exist about political leadership in news 
media more than 20 years since the advent of democracy. Quantitative manifest 
content analysis is utilised to analyse newspaper articles from the City Press, Mail & 
Guardian, the Sunday Independent and the Sunday Times. The results show that 
media representation of political leadership is most discussed in opinion articles and 
editorials and relies on key democratic concepts such as freedom of expression and 
freedom of the media. The key themes and ideas that emerge include the 
personalisation of leadership, defining leadership, debate on how to lead, Zuma’s own 
leadership traits versus expectations and it became clear that news media evaluated 
Zuma as head of state or leader of the nation more often than as president of his party.  
 
Key terms: democracy, news media, representation, political leadership, agenda 
setting 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
This research report focuses on media representation of political leadership and 
governance in South Africa from December 2007 to January 2013 when President 
Jacob Zuma served his first term as leader of the African National Congress (ANC) 
and later the head of state of the Republic of South Africa (from May 2009). To 
understand how news media describes political leadership occurs in South Africa, the 
focus should be on the reporting on political leaders and their intrigues. In the case of 
South African news media 1, Zuma’s time leading his party, the ANC and being 
president of the country gives us a crucial lens to unearth how political leadership is 
understood, discussed and engaged in the post-apartheid landscape. 
 
South Africa is a relatively new democracy and news media plays a significant role in 
setting the agenda for what to expect of political leadership in government. The 
history of the country, which Cowling and Hamilton (2011) describe as a society 
shaped by the transition in 1994 from a racialised totalitarian regime to a 
constitutional democracy and transnational free-market economy shapes media. 
Consequently, public deliberation is a marked feature of the governmental, civic and 
public arrangements. In part, this is a consequence of the country’s transition to 
democracy through a negotiated settlement, which agreed on a constitution enshrining 
individual rights, including freedom of expression (Cowling & Hamilton, 2011). 
 
Because of the transition to democracy, the news media in South Africa has taken 
seriously the rights granted to it by the interim Constitution of 1993 and later the final 
1996 Constitution. They have actively sought to cement normative expectations in a 
liberal democracy that is to serve as a forum encouraging pluralistic debate about 
public affairs, to be a guardian against the abuse of power and a mobilising agent 
encouraging public learning and participation in the political process (Norris, 2000 in 
Jebril, Stetka, & Loveless, 2013).  
 
It is in this context of a vibrant media that seeks to hold those in power accountable 
that Zuma has been a figure of controversy since the substantive fallout over his                                                         1 Defined here narrowly and only concerns newspapers but broadly it would include broadcast and online media such as radio, television, websites and social media. 
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criminal trial in 2005 when he was accused of alleged rape by the daughter of his 
friend, Fezekile Ntsukela Kuzwayo (most famously known as “Khwezi”). Although 
the High Court in Johannesburg eventually dismissed the charges, during the trial, 
Zuma admitted to having unprotected sex with his accuser who was HIV positive and 
took a shower to avoid contracting the disease. His accuser later had to go into exile 
due to Zuma’s supporters harassing her. Zuma at the time was head of the National 
Aids Council, a position traditionally held by the sitting deputy president of the 
country (Thamm, 2016).  
 
Later in 2005 Zuma was dismissed as deputy president by President Thabo Mbeki, 
due to corruption charges in relation to the R30 billion government deal for the 
acquisition of arms for the military, the Strategic Defence Package or more popularly 
known as the “Arms Deal” scandal. His former financier Schabir Shaik was convicted 
in 2007 of fraud and corruption related to the Arms Deal and the court proved a 
corrupt and fraudulent relationship between Shaik and Zuma. Zuma then faced 
hundreds of charges in a separate trial but the charges were subsequently dropped by 
the then acting national director of public prosecutions at the time, Mokotedi Mpshe. 
Later on as president of the country, Zuma has continued to be mired in scandal after 
scandal over alleged corrupt and questionable relationships with businesspersons 
including the Gupta family who publish the New Age newspaper and own the 
broadcaster ANN7.  
 
Added to this were other scandals, including in 2010 when he had a child outside his 
four marriages to the multimillion non-security upgrades to his private residence at 
Nkandla and finally the Gupta-linked scandals (see for example, Booysen, 2015; 
Daniels, 2012; Masondo, 2016; Ntuli, 2010; Rague, 2010; Southall, 2013 and Uting, 
2011).  
 
Beyond Zuma’s history, when South Africa became a democracy under the leadership 
of Nelson Mandela many expectations were created of political leadership. Shaun 
Johnson, then editor at The Star, wrote in a column prior to the landmark 1994 
democratic elections that: 
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Soon, so very soon, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela’s followers will begin to 
dismantle apartheid and the nameless discrimination that preceded it … He, of 
all people, feels the gravity of that prospect, and the weight of presidential 
responsibility about to descend on his shoulders (Johnson, 1994). 
 
Johnson’s words give a glimpse of what those in the news media during the transition 
and in the immediate post-1994 environment saw in the future democratic South 
Africa. Criteria were already being set out for what leaders had to do and achieve with 
high expectations from everyone. So leaders after Mandela have had the added burden 
of meeting the promises of 1994, Mandela’s achievements and the ideals of the 
Constitution. 
 
At the same time, while the Constitution and the democratisation process is used as 
the basis of journalism work in South Africa, the news media has come to face 
resistance from politicians according to media academic Glenda Daniels. In her PhD 
thesis, Daniels (2010) explored the relationship between the media and the governing 
African National Congress (ANC) and found that news media is subjected to a desire 
by the ANC for more unity and consensus in a fractured society. Daniels argued that 
the ANC’s default position is that the news media is not loyal and supportive of its 
programmes and this contradicts the Constitution and the professional code of 
conduct that encourages holding power to account, exposing abuses and being a 
watchdog for democracy (Daniels, 2010).  
 
During the 2007 to 2013 period, the continued maligned relationship between 
elements of the governing ANC, government and the news media reached its peak in 
2012 when Brett Murray’s Spear artwork was unveiled at the Goodman Gallery in 
Johannesburg (see Freedberg, 2012) showing Zuma in a classic Leninisque pose with 
his penis hanging out of his trousers, which led to protests organised by the ANC 
outside the art gallery. The painting was a comment on Zuma’s personal infidelities 
and rape trial. The painting was eventually vandalised live on national television and 
this particular issue brought into question freedom of expression and what is seen as 
appropriate by those in powerful positions versus artists, art galleries and journalists 
(see Van Wyk, 2012 and  Pillay, 2012).  
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Aim and rationale of the study 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the themes and ideas that arise regarding political 
leadership of South Africa and how the media represented them during the Zuma 
presidency. Key questions include: how does the news media represent political 
leadership and governance in South Africa? How is the leader of the country during 
this period discussed as a political leader and someone responsible for governing 
South Africa? What does it tell us about the narratives/expectations in the media 
about political leadership and governance? What are the themes that arise in the print 
media about leadership and governance in a democratic South Africa and the 
implications for society? 
 
In the period between 2010 and 2013, I worked as a reporter for Independent 
Newspapers and spent time in different newsrooms including the Cape Times, Cape 
Argus and later the Sunday Independent covering local and national politics and social 
issues, especially in the legislatures and political parties. I was fascinated by how 
journalists see their role in a democracy and in general about politicians and 
leadership. I noticed a disconnect in how reporters worked and what the editors 
decided was important enough to be published and that there was a lens through 
which politics was understood in a newsroom and this was explained reported and 
packaged for newspaper readers and which analysis was prioritised. Furthermore 
regular or guest columnists were chosen based on editors’ views (see Serino, 2009). It 
became clear to me that editors and broadly newspaper owners were influential 
citizens who were conditioning and influencing large audiences about politics, 
leadership and how it works. 
 
Another observation I made was that weekly newspapers, especially set the agenda 
for the news cycle and would break stories that exposed much wrongdoing in political 
parties, the government and other institutions. Political leaders’ reprimands created a 
tug of war between the media and the ANC specifically, where reporters would ask 
tough questions but then be costantly shut down or attacked.  
 
This ties in well with the Daniels’ (2010) argument that since 1994 various groupings 
within the ANC have come to understand the relationship of the party with the media 
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as a combative contest and that the news media is not legitimate and is undermining 
democracy because it upholds “different values” (Daniels, 2010).  
 
It was in this context that I sought to answer the above research questions and chose 
to focus on what I deemed the four leading agenda-setting weeklies: City Press, Mail 
& Guardian, the Sunday Independent and the Sunday Times. The main reason for the 
choice of the four newspapers is their reputation; they are well respected and taken 
seriously by their detractors and provide much more space for debate through letters, 
opinion pieces and other forms. 
 
In setting the agenda, these newspapers, set the tone for the rest of media each week 
on the most important stories and this is explained by the Sunday Times being the 
most read newspaper in the country whilst City Press and Mail and Guardian have 
produced major scoops and investigations such as the Nkandla scandal and deep 
reporting on politics. On the other hand, the Sunday Independent is heavily focused 
on political analysis and it is well respected as a cerebral newspaper.  
 
Additionally, these four newspapers represent the largest print and online media 
organisations in the country outside of the major broadcasters. Media24 owns City 
Press, Mail and Guardian by M&G Media, Sunday Independent by Independent 
Media and the Sunday Times by Times Media Group. Additionally, broadcast media, 
including the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), eTV and Primedia, in 
South Africa tend to depend on print media for investigative and political stories.  
Therefore, this research aims to understand the relationship between news media and 
democracy; especially the study of media and democratisation and how public 
leadership and governance is understood but also the type of leadership South Africa 
is thought to needed to succeed.   
 
Additionally, news media sets a high bar for itself and this is explained in its Press 
Council preamble on ethics and conduct for South African news media that:  
The media exist to serve society. Their freedom provides for independent 
scrutiny of the forces that shape society, and is essential to realising the 
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promise of democracy. It enables citizens to make informed judgments on the 
issues of the day, a role whose centrality is recognised in the South African 
Constitution. The media strive to hold these rights in trust for the country's 
citizens; and they are subject to the same rights and duties as the individual. 
Everyone has the duty to defend and further these rights, in recognition of the 
struggles that created them: the media, the public and government, who all 
make up the democratic state. The media's work is guided at all times by the 
public interest, understood to describe information of legitimate interest or 
importance to citizens. As journalists we commit ourselves to the highest 
standards, to maintain credibility and keep the trust of the public. This means 
always striving for truth, avoiding unnecessary harm, reflecting a multiplicity 
of voices in our coverage of events, showing a special concern for children 
and other vulnerable groups, exhibiting sensitivity to the cultural customs of 
their readers and the subjects of their reportage, and acting independently 
(Press Council of South Africa, 2016). 
 
Added to the media role in democracy, this research would potentially contribute to 
media representation and political science theories especially around public leadership 
and governance of elected leaders. Additionally, it will shine more light on the 
significance of the news media as a political actor in its own right and what it deems 
important for society. This research also would add clarification on the potential role 
of news media as a democratising agent, on democratic institution building and how 
the media is an actor that determines changes and influences citizen political attitudes 
and behaviour in the democratic transition in South Africa (Jebril, Stetka, & Loveless, 
2013).  
 
A short biography of Jacob Zuma  
According to the  ANC’s website, President Jacob Zuma was born on 12 April 1942 
in Nkandla in the northern part of KwaZulu-Natal province. He became an active 
member of the ANC in the early 1960s through conscientisation by his elder cousin 
Muntukabongwa Zuma who fought in the Second World War. He later was tutored in 
politics by ANC luminaries such as Harry Gwala, Steven Dlamini, Moses Mabhida, 
and John Nkadimeng.  
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In 1963, the apartheid government arrested and sent him to Robben Island to serve a 
10-year sentence. After his release, he went into exile to Swaziland and Mozambique, 
working closely with Thabo Mbeki to undermine the apartheid government. Later he 
became a member of the ANC’s national executive committee in the 1970s, then chief 
representative of the ANC in Mozambique and later promoted in the 1980s to head of 
the intelligence department of the party. On his return from exile, during the lead up 
to the negotiations towards a democracy, the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA) he participated in the Groote-Schuur Minute process in 1990, an 
agreement that outlined important decisions regarding the return of exiles and the 
release of political prisoners and in 1991 he became deputy to then secretary general, 
Cyril Ramaphosa. He then became pivotal in the then Natal province when he 
negotiated a peace agreement between his party and the Inkatha Freedom Party which 
had participated in a low-level civil war in the province and other parts of the country. 
In 1994, he became member of the executive council (MEC) for economic affairs and 
tourism in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government and later elected the national 
chairperson of the ANC. In 1999, President Mbeki appointed him deputy president of 
the country and in 2007, he was elected president of the ANC defeating Mbeki. In 
September 2008, Mbeki was forced to resign the state presidency by the ANC and 
replaced by Kgalema Motlanthe. In May 2009, Motlanthe gave way to Zuma to 
assume the deputy presidency of the country following national elections won by the 
ANC. Zuma was then elected in the National Assembly as president of the country 
(African National Congress, n.d.).  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
 
Journalists in South Africa, especially since the post-1994 period have always 
maintained that they are fulfilling a constitutional and sometimes moral role as the 
public’s watchdogs and as the Press Council preamble sets in the previous section, the 
media exists to serve society. This suggests that the media in serving society is a big 
player and in exposing wrongdoing, journalism takes on those who are shaping 
society and in this way contributes towards the democratisation of the country. 
Additionally, the Press Council argues that through its work, journalism allows 
citizens in a democratic and constitutional state to make informed judgments on the 
issues affecting them on an everyday basis (Press Council of South Africa, 2016). 
Relying on these views and actions of journalism in South Africa and the ideals they 
espouse, this literature review discusses media representation theories in cultural 
studies and political science theories on political leadership. These theoretical 
frameworks are relevant to explain news media views on leadership in a newly 
transitioned democracy.   
 
The news media in post-apartheid South Africa rely on norms and standards based on 
long-standing democratic principles and theories to do their work and keep those in 
power in check - this can be found in the South African Press Code governing print 
media and other internal company rules and in most editorials.  
 
The use of media representation and political leadership theories in this paper is 
additionally based on the agenda-setting capability of news media that is derived from 
political thought and additionally, political theorists have been used because they have 
thought about leadership and this will help us understand media views. In addition, 
news media reporting on political leadership, especially the behaviour of persons in 
political authority, their competitors and these in interaction with other members of 
society is strongly dependent on an understood approach to politics in a newsroom 
and to a certain extent, the philosophy of the publication.  
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Examples of agenda setting can be seen in South Africa, for instance, in how news 
media writes about tips and leaks from political party factions. This implies that there 
are close relations between those who speak about power and those in power (e.g. 
ANC factional fights, DA leadership changes, ANC Mangaung elective conference 
factions etc.). Because of this access to power, other examples of agenda setting 
included the instance of news media reporting blow-by-blow the battles for power 
between Presidents Mbeki and Zuma from 2005 onwards (Brümmer, 2015). Other 
agenda setting stories included the long investigation into what became the Nkandla 
scandal and an even more important symbol of agenda setting example was how 
Zuma came to be identified in his presidency due to what he confessed in a court of 
law during his rape trial, and this was the Zapiro showerhead image (see Van Wyk 
2009).  
 
The showerhead image of President Zuma has become the visual representation of the 
politician and to paraphrase Stuart Hall the image became a cliché and confirmed that 
the modern world and culture is saturated by the image in a variety of different forms 
and this is the representation we have of the leader of the country (Hall, 1997). 
Zapiro’s use of Zuma’s image was also malleable and changed with the times, where 
it started from showerhead and symbolising the rape trial, it then moved to the 
corruption trial and showing a besieged man to the Zunami and rise to power of an 
invisible and secretive man to the man who became a chortling president and 
exclaimed in the National Assembly: “Nkandla, Nkandla, Nkandla” when mocking 
the opposition over their attacks on him using news media. This confirms what 
McCombs (2014) describes as the ability of the news media to sway public opinion:  
 
The pictures in people’s minds about the outside world are significantly 
influenced by the mass media, both what those pictures are about and what 
those pictures are. The agenda-setting effects of the mass media also have 
significant implications beyond the pictures created in people’s heads. In the 
original, traditional domain of agenda-setting, the salience of public issues, 
there is considerable evidence that the shifting salience of issues on the media 
agenda often are the basis for public opinion about the overall performance in 
office of a public leader. In turn, the salience of a leader in the news also is 
linked with whether an individual holds any opinion at all. At the second level 
  
10  
of agenda-setting, the salience of affective attributes intertwined with the 
public’s cognitive pictures of these leaders represents the convergence of 
attribute agenda-setting with opinion formation and change. Beyond attitudes 
and opinions, the pictures of reality created by the mass media have 
implications for personal behaviours, ranging from college applications to 
voting on Election Day (McCombs, 2014). 
 
Below the theories of media representation are discussed and followed by those from 
political science to explain political leadership, which is bridged with a discussion on 
political journalism, the news media as political actors in a democracy and followed 
on by news media values.  
 
Theories of media representation 
 
Media and power relations 
 
From the 1970s, studies of media representation questioned what the media was 
offering consumers – that is a selective definition of reality based on the interests of 
the dominant class. There was an assumption that the media was influential by 
mapping society and creating themes of reference through which people made sense 
of society, which deflected wider social conflict and reinforced dominant political 
norms (Curran 2003, 109).  
 
Therefore, media representation looks at media constructions of society, influence and 
persuasion about leaders and society in general and these can be found in opinion in 
print media, television show debates, political writing by political actor and in 
academic work.  
 
Curran (2003, 232) also argues that a key variable influencing media representation 
“is the way in which power is organized within a system”. As Curran notes: “Another 
significant influence is the degree to which the prevailing power network coheres. If 
disagreements develop within it, these are generally reproduced in the media” (Curran 
2003). Curran also says that the fourth estate can operate in a way that supposedly 
exemplifies liberal theory, so for example “tip-offs from rival elite groups can trigger 
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investigative journalism, their conflicts can generate media debate and a consensus 
arise from this debate.  
 
For Hall (1997, 6) representation is the way meaning is given to things through 
depiction via images, therefore it is measuring the gap between what one thinks of as 
the true meaning of an event or object and how it is presented in the media. For Hall 
(1997, 7) representation has no real meaning until it has been represented (an image is 
created or attached to an event or object by the powerful, including the media) and the 
form changes and representation is a constitution of events as well.). Additionally 
representation means the use of language to say something meaningful about, or to 
represent, the world meaningfully to others through shared meanings or conceptual 
maps. Therefore, representation is an essential part of the process by which meaning 
is produced and exchanged between members of a culture. It involves not just images 
but language and signs (Hall, 1997).  
 
In addition, media representation uses societal ideology and the section below looks at 
this.  
 
Media representation, ideology and social order 
 
Hall in his The rediscovery of ideology in 1982 wrote that representation is a very 
different notion from that of reflection. “It implies the active work of selecting and 
presenting, of structuring and shaping” (Hall, 1982) (see Serino 2009 on Sunday 
Times opinion pages’ creation). What Hall, meant was that the media continues to 
underwrite systematically a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional 
procedures, that is, the rules of the game – the media determines what society knows 
in cahoots with those in power because it is reliant on those in power and in turn has 
to be part of the power structure to stay relevant.  (Hall, The rediscovery of ideology: 
return of the repressed in media studies, 1982, 64) 
 
Therefore, Hall (1982, 87) sees the media as the means of representation: 
to be impartial and independent in their daily operations, they cannot be seen 
to take directions from the powerful, or…to be bending their accounts of the 
world… But they must be sensitive to, and can only survive legitimately by 
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operating within, the general boundaries or framework of ‘what everyone 
agrees’ to be the consensus.  
 
Later, Curran (2003, 211), in agreement with Hall, found that the mass media had 
assumed the role of the Church in a more secular age. They interpret and make sense 
of the world to the mass public:  
Like their predecessors, professional communicators amplify systems of 
representation that legitimise the social system. 
  
Curran (2003, 223) says the priesthood told their congregations that the power 
structure was divinely sanctioned and the media successors tell the audiences that the 
government is democratically sanctioned through elections.  
 
For Fürsich (2010), representation has become embedded in the 24-hour cycle of 
media cable services and social media and have therefore become a culture that has 
assumed meaning and become knowledge depositories - therefore representation 
speaks to a sustained image…delivered across media channels and outlets.  
 
Criticism of media representation theories 
 
Analysis of media representation theories shows it has held steadfast in academia and 
there is little criticism but much agreement. What the area lacks is the understanding 
that in new democracies such as South Africa legacy issues are important in terms of 
where you stood in support or against the regime. Some media and journalists 
organisations during apartheid took an oppositionist stand against the government and 
supported the Struggle and many were forcibly closed down. Other media houses 
supported the apartheid status quo and were mouthpieces of that autocratic 
government. After 1994 and the adoption of 1996 Constitution, a new liberal 
dispensation arose and called for criticism of those in power and most media houses 
ran with the freedom of speech they attained with democracy and would say they are 
doing their duty and feel they must promote the democratic dispensation, including 
those who used to support the former authoritarian power.  
 
Also for Curran (2003, 211) there is a contradiction in the role of the news media in 
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that they are seen as rivals to professional politicians: 
 
both groups have competing claims of legitimacy: they both claim to represent 
the public and serve the public interest.  
 
For Fourie and Karam (2011) media representation disregards the distinctive 
attributes and character of media products, the genre of the media product, the 
intricate connection between the real world and portrayal, the intention of a journalist 
and the character of perception and media user.  
 
Another criticism is that media representation does not take into account that some 
journalists could be used by politicians unwittingly, especially when a story is too 
good to ignore and also journalism training tends to blind new journalists by teaching 
them to be normative and only later do they learn how they real world works.  
 
Therefore, the real argument against media representation theories is that they can 
lead to an idea that there is no truth, only constructions of truth, which makes it 
impossible for media to do its historical job of providing information to people.And 
we can see that the current ‘post-truth environment’ is really no better for societies 
than the mass-mediated era. In the ‘post-truth environment’, societies and political 
players are polarised into opposing groups, as seen in the recent United States 
presidential election and the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum. There is 
widespread use of social media channels (and in legacy media – radio and television) 
such as Facebook and Twitter, blogs and websites for conspiracy theories, outright 
lies, fake news, the use of false equivalence and misinformation by politicians and 
some journalists to support their positions and assumptions by disregarding 
established facts (Lewis, 2016).  
 
Political journalism, media as political actors, democracy and news values 
 
According to Nielsen and Kuhn (2014, 1): 
In its self-conception, the popular imaginary, and the social sciences, political 
journalism in Western European democracies is regarded as a key part of 
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democratic politics and at the very heart of the journalistic vocation 
I argue that South Africa is similar to Western democracies and has for a long time 
taken ideas from that region and applied them – if you examine the structure of the 
1996 Constitution, it has similarities to the post-unity German model, with especially 
the creation and construction of the Constitutional Court and the strong protections in 
the Bill of Rights similar to the 1789 post-French Revolution’s Declaration of Rights 
and of the Citizen, especially freedom of expression. Other elements include a 
Westminster-style Parliament with adjustments such as proportional representation 
and the direct election of the President by legislature members, similar to how a Prime 
Minister is chosen in Westminster-style parliaments by commanding the confidence 
of the majority of MPs. Additionally, civic engagement by non-government actors 
such as workers’ unions and activists can at times resemble the organising that is 
prevalent in the United States and the United Kingdom whether through social media, 
protests and petitions. This may be due to the long history of colonialism in South 
Africa and later, apartheid, when the state was an active supporter and beneficiary of 
the West during the Cold War.  
And because of historical influences, political journalism, to Nielsen and Kuhn (2014) 
even in South Africa is seen as formally independent institution that is part and parcel 
of representative politics, engaged in criticizing those in positions of power, 
promoting particular political actors, issues, and views, keeping people at least to 
some extent informed about public affairs and mobilising citizens for political action 
but it is also about politics and power, in short, as much about democracy as it is 
about the media.  
To hammer the point home, Gumede (2014) writes that the obvious role of the media 
in a constitutional democracy such as South Africa is both representative and 
participatory. It is there to provide information to citizens, not only specialized 
reporting but also inform people of what is happening, providing criticism, 
questioning and putting pressure on leaders.  
Gumede (2014) adds that the role of media is not only based on accepted democratic 
norms that South Africa has accepted but also has to go beyond traditional role of 
informing:  
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The media…has [to] contribute to public education and enlightenment by 
showing quality, diverse cultural, political and social and news programmes to 
a nation where large swathes never had access to decent education – this 
would allow opportunities to many to broaden their minds, outlooks and social 
advancement Gumede (2014).   
Also Horwitz (2001) writing about communication and democratic reform in South 
Africa said media is where democracy most concretely manifests:  
because that arena represents and constitutes the independent political 
institution wherein citizens can engage in the discussion of the commonweal 
[th]. (Sanef 1996) 
For South African political journalists, their role of criticism, engagement, promotion 
and keeping people informed through their reporting plays a significant role in how 
they represent certain political leaders and figures, how certain parties govern - hence 
my interest in how the media represents political leadership and governance during 
the Zuma presidency.  
Therefore, political journalism, Nielsen and Kuhn (2014) say, is a journalism that 
generally shares with the majority of politicians, social scientists, and citizens a 
‘legitimist vision’ of electoral politics, accepting the latter’s basic legitimacy as 
indisputable and its importance as a given, and often by implication regarding any 
outside challenge to this system with considerable scepticism. For Nielsen and Kuhn, 
it is a form of journalism that is overwhelmingly practised by salaried white-collar 
professionals working for legacy news media organisations such as newspapers and 
broadcasters including their online operations – the South African versions are the 
SABC, eNCA, Independent Media, Media24 and the Times Media Group.  
At the outset, in 1994 before the April 27 elections, Mandela told the International 
Press Institute in Cape Town that a critical, independent press was going to be the 
lifeblood of democracy: 
The press must be free from state interference. It must have the economic 
strength to stand up to the blandishments of government officials. It must have 
sufficient independence from vested interests to be bold and inquiring without 
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fear or favour…. it is only such a free press that can temper the appetite of any 
government to amass power at the expense of the citizen…The African 
National Congress has nothing to fear from criticism. I can promise you, we 
will not wilt under close scrutiny. It is our considered view that such criticism 
can only help us to grow, by calling to attention to those of our actions and 
omissions which do not measure up to our people’s expectations and the 
democratic values to which we subscribe (Valentine, 1994). 
What this reveals, was Mandela’s acceptance of Western democratic ideals of what 
media should do, but the honeymoon did not last long when the ANC was in power. 
Since that pre-election speech, leaders of the ANC have called media oppositionist 
and seen them as obstructionist. At a meeting with the South African National Editors 
Forum in November 1996, Mandela told editors that media ownership and control 
was not reflective of the population:  
…if senior black journalists – who are in the position to interpret the 
aspirations of the community –criticize us, then give us the right to criticize 
them. Freedom of expression is not a monopoly of the press; it is a right of all 
of us…. We have had strange experiences with some journalists, where you 
brief them on the true facts – but some are beyond the pale; they say they 
agree with you and later say the opposite. You can’t expect us to be quiet. We 
will not reply to every criticism. But certain criticism you can’t ignore. Where 
government makes mistakes, you must say so. Where you make mistakes, we 
should say so… (SANEF, 1996, 7). 
Since then Mandela’s successors have also been unrelenting in their criticism, from 
Mbeki in his first ANC Today weekly column on the ANC website, saying the mass 
media did not represent the majority: 
 
we therefore have to contend with the situation that masquerades as ‘public 
opinion’, as reflected in the bulk of our meda, is in fact minority opinion 
informed by the historic social and political position occupied by this minority 
(Hamlyn 2008).  
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In one of the last columns of ANC Today, Zuma wrote in 2008 that the media was 
politically and ideologically out of sync with society: 
 
though there are plenty of newspapers and magazines on our newststands, and 
a multitude of radio and TV stations occupying our airwaves, the overall 
orientation of South African media is politically conservative. There are few, 
if any, mainstream media outlets that articulate a progressive left perspective – 
which is endorsed at each election by the majority of South Africans and 
represented by the ANC, its allies and the broader democratic movement 
(quoted in Hamlyn 2008) 
 
So it is clear from what ANC leaders have said about the role of journalism and 
additionally that  the media are political actors and use their news values to inform 
their actions. There is agreement on what media should be doing but disagreement 
shows that interpretation is at the heart of the argument.  
 
And due to this disagreement, Louw (2000) wrote that  the environment in which 
media works dictates news values - and their ability to apply them:  
 
In a dictatorship, for example, news values are ultimately dictated by the 
authorities. They decide what can and cannot be published and thus they set 
the news values. There is no way one can exercise an evaluation of news, the 
selection of news and the publication of news if there is no freedom of 
expression or freedom of the media because the values are then not open to 
debate from different standpoints or to assessment by journalists, but are pre-
determined by an imposed authority (Louw, 2000). 
 
But news values in a democratic state, Louw says, subscribe to the rule of law, the 
supremacy of the constitution and enshrined concepts of the freedom of the media and 
freedom of expression. In such a situation news are decided by journalists and others 
exercising their freedoms to decide the kind of publication they wish to publish, the 
subject matter they will deal with and the readers they hope to attract. 
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Thus in South Africa news media have freedom of choice, of selection and of 
deciding what set of values they are going to apply to their content, whether that be of 
news, features and humorous articles, and, of course, what standards of propriety are 
to be applied.   
 
I reached the conclusion that in a democracy news values are predicated to 
freedom of expression and, by extension, to the values applying to freedom of 
expression and human rights. Thus, the values applying to freedom of 
expression apply to news values and how they are exercised. Are these foreign 
values imposed on us? Or are they the values that manifest themselves because 
of the transformation taking place in South African society and which is 
focusing attention on other cultural and social values? (Louw, 2000). 
 
I argue that no matter what these changes are, the fact is that South Africa is a country 
that subscribes to Western liberal democratic values’ system and this is shown in how 
the constitution was investigated, debated and finally written and it is that same 
supreme law that has been accepted by South African society as a whole and for 
which many still fight for and with to keep government accountable, whether  that is 
through the courts, protest action or requesting hidden or classified information 
through the Promotion of Access to Information Act. It is against this background that 
we operate in this society. Thus, it is my view that news values in a democratic state 
are inextricably bound up in freedom of expression and freedom of the media .  
 
Therefore, this discussion shows that political journalism and news media in general 
are seen as political actors not only by media practitioners and academics but  also 
importantly by politicians.  
 
Finally, Wasserman (2010) writes that, with democratisation, the media enjoy greater 
freedom with an expectation to perform a ‘watchdog role’, while governments would 
prefer media to support them in achieving national and developmental goals, as can be 
seen in what Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma have said or written about the media above:  
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An important perspective that emerged on media freedom in post-apartheid 
South Africa, was that the media have now become political players in their 
own right (Wasserman, 2010). 
 
In a study he conducted with South African journalists he found that the respondents 
described their watchdog role in a similar fashion to an opposition political party or 
alternative power centre to the government. On the other hand, interviews with 
politicians, Wasserman (2010) found that they agreed that the media was ‘the 
opposition’ but also described journalists as being embedded with opposition factions 
within the ruling party or later being hired as spin doctors in government, the state or 
other political parties.  
 
Due to the news media being a political actor, it is vital to understand what political 
science has to say political leadership in a democracy and in an environment in which 
the media depends on and defends a political document, the Constitution, to justify its 
existence and work, the section below discusses theories of political leadership and 
governance. 
 
Political science theories on political leadership and governance 
 
This section will look at political leadership and governance as political science 
concepts and what criteria a leader/leadership has to fulfil theoretically and what 
conditions are necessary for an institution, country to party to be well governed. 
These criteria will be used to evaluate the opinion in the research that follows this 
proposal.  
 
What does political science tell us about political leadership? 
 
According to Paige (1977, 1): 
Political leadership is the behaviour of persons in political authority, their 
competitors and these in interaction with other members of society…  
 
This, Paige says, means not only the behaviour of the people in the highest authority 
but also people at intermediate and lower levels. He says we are not only talking 
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about presidents, monarchs and premiers, but also party provincial chairmen, mayors 
and village chiefs, headmen and leaders of party cells.  
 
For Paige, we are not only looking at single personalities but also ‘collective 
leadership’, which is espoused by the ANC, interaction with followers and it means 
leadership not only in one type of institutions (e.g. party, legislature or bureaucracy) 
or process (e.g. policy decision, election or revolution) but across them all.  
 
Paige also places emphasis on how rulers rule, whether through moral suasion and 
reasoned agreement or via fear and force and whether they are successful or not.  
 
For Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight (2013, 4) political leadership “is one of the 
most widely experienced and ‘intuitively’ understood phenomena”. Examples include 
great power competition, Olympic rivalries, climate change, the right to develop or 
human rights controversies and others. They say that the ‘political leadership’ concept 
is difficult to define because it is dependent on institutional, cultural and historical 
contexts and situations (echoing Blondel 1987; Wildavsky 2006; Wildasky 1989; 
Klenke 1996).  
 
If political leadership as a concept is hard to define, then what constitutes its elements, 
The Oxford English Dictionary (online version) defines leadership as: 
 
The dignity, office, or position of a leader, especially of a political party; 
ability to lead; the position of a group of people leading or influencing others 
within a given context; the group itself; the action or influence necessary for 
the direction or organisation of effort in a group undertaking. 
 
Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight say, taking into account the dictionary’s definition, 
to lead means goal-setting and motivation and will figure prominently “as essential 
attributes of the notion of leadership” and there are elements in defining ‘political 
leadership’: 
 
• The personality and traits of a leader or leaders, including ethical and cultural 
character 
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• The traits and ethical-cultural character of his or her followers 
• The societal or organisational context in which the leader-follower interaction 
occurs 
• The agenda of collective problems or tasks which confront the leaders and 
followers in particular historical situations 
• The nature of the leader’s interpretive judgment 
• The means, material and intangible, that the leaders use to attain their ends 
• And the effects or results of leadership, whether real or symbolic, long-lasting 
or transient.  
 
Since we live in a country that is democratic and people fought to have such a system, 
then it follows then that political leadership is expected to be democratic. Below I 
outline democratic political leadership as explored by Teles.  
 
Fundamental role of exercising leadership in a democratic society 
 
In democratic societies, political leaders have an important role in creating 
alternatives and displaying opportunities to choose between rival strategies for the 
public realm based on the citizen’s preferences, according to Teles (2015). This 
means that not only are leaders “responsive” to situations and individuals, they are 
“responsible”. In other words, for Teles, there must be three political leadership 
functions: 
• ‘Governing’ as a way to improve coordination and to provide strategic 
leadership, therefore leaders must be able to generate policy ideas through 
negotiation and communicating them through the organisation.  
• ‘Governance’ must be the result of understanding the complexity of 
relations between different levels and functions of government, relating to 
private organisations, other public authorities and developing partnerships 
and networks of policy delivery and deliberation and;  
• ‘Allegiance’ and commitment to supporters but leaders ensure that they 
keep their formal position without jeopardising their vision for the 
organisation (Elcock, 2001 adapted by Teles, 2015).  
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Although Teles (2015) using Elcock (2001) sets out political leadership functions, he 
does not speak about the media’s role is in a democratic society when evaluating 
leaders but Helms (2012) does.  
  
Political leadership in the new media age 
 
When it comes to evaluating political leadership, Helms (2012) finds that the mass 
media are of primary importance in assessing the opportunities and constraints that 
contemporary leaders face but political leaders try to influence the media to their 
advantage.  
 
For Helms, three media features affect the conditions for good democratic political 
leadership and how they respond: 
• The greater number of different media with strongly differing features – 
newspapers, online, social media, radio, television and multimedia 
• There is an expanded focus of media coverage on people’s lives and very little 
escapes attention, think of the focus on politicians and their families. 
• Citizens use different media more intensively and move between them easily, 
from online to print to radio. 
 
Because of the functional and structural changes to mass media as they relate to the 
conditions of democratic political leadership, Helms (2012) says an impact 
assessment can be made by looking at: 
• Effectiveness – democratic leadership can be described as effective if it 
succeeds in identifying and solving social and political problems effectively 
and with democratic means 
• Responsibility – this is an elusive and much-contested concept because being 
responsible as a politician can mean many things; but it usually relates to the 
responsible allocation of scarce resources, such as money; and constant 
responsiveness of leaders to the interests of citizens…between elections 
• Authenticity – authentic leadership requires that the political actions of a 
leader are consistent with his or her convictions and beliefs.  
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Even though political leadership can be evaluated in a new media age through Helms’ 
criteria, one should also understand that politicians are personalised by the media. 
McAllister (2007) says “the single most often-noted effect of the changing nature of 
media coverage of politics is personalisation”. McAllister believes personalisation is 
may be “the” central feature of politics in the 21st century. Personalisation means the 
systematic focusing of the mass media and the public on the individual top candidates 
of parties or the incumbent because they have a higher entertainment value and 
economic potential than any balanced analysis of competing policy agendas 
(McAllister, 2007).  
 
Although mass media personalises politics, politicians are not innocent and they also 
utilise media to develop high profiles, often similar to Hollywood celebrities, in order 
to win voters’ trust and support during election campaigns, according to Pakulski 
(2013). Pakulski writes that leaders then play an increasingly central role in governing 
elites in their own political grouping - whereby there is a trend towards the growing 
profile and centrality of leaders through ‘personalisation’ or ‘presidentialisation’ of 
democratic politics and a shift towards ‘leader democracy’. This Pakulski (2013) says 
leads to a political configuration in which leaders play the major role in generating 
mass trust and electoral mandate-authorisation such as the United States presidential 
elections.  
 
As much as leaders are personalised and have become central, political leadership is 
still exercised competitively (Pakulski 2013) – this also involves ‘leaders of the 
opposition’ and by small leadership groups. A political party does not only involve its 
known leaders but also deputies and trusted advisors who form the leadership group. 
For Pakulski (2013) such leadership group – the ‘inner circles’, ‘courts’ and ‘core 
executives’ are leader-centred but vary in size and composition. Therefore, the high 
profile and influence of political leaders should not be conflated with successful 
‘good’ leadership.  
 
Pakulski (2013) says Mandela, for example, was a high profile democratic leader who 
ensured the 1994 democratic election was won by his party, the ANC by negotiating 
with the former government and because of that and his force of personality, he 
ushered in a new era with a lot of power and influence: 
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He surrounded himself with an ‘inner circle’, ‘courts’, ‘kitchen cabinets’ and 
gained very high approval and enormous influence over his government, 
parliamentary and party colleagues – he became the main agent of social and 
political change and peaceful revolution (Pakulski 2013). 
 
But a warning from March and Weil (2005) is that there leadership idealism in 
political science, and they say that:  
 
it is not at all clear that leadership requires any remarkable talents, or that 
major differences in the success of organisations reflect differences in the 
capabilities of their leader, or that history is the product of leaders’ actions 
(March and Weil, 2005).  
 
For political leader to rule or run a country, they have to govern based on certain 
prescripts – what works in that country may not be the same as the neighbouring 
country and there may be influences from outsiders. 
 
In the case of South Africa, the current governing party, the ANC, says it practises 
collective accountability through its national executive committee to lead society and 
this is also partly reflected by the structure of the country’s Cabinet. The president in 
both cases is first among equals and is a member of a group who is officially on the 
same level as the other members but in fact has more slightly more responsibility or 
power (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 
 
The ANC through its then deputy president Zuma, in the City Press, mainitained that 
collective leadership is a central pillar of the party’s principles, meaning that there is a 
culture of openness, comradeship and solidarity between leaders of the organisation. 
Additionally respect for and acceptance of decisions of the collective, “while each 
individual member of the collective retains the right to raise and reraise any matter, 
within constitutional structures, which she/he believes requires review”.  
 
Leaders should always lead by example, as custodians of the values and best 
practices of the movement. This should apply in good time and bad – ensuring 
  
25  
that the interests of the movement come first in everything we do. Especially 
in difficult times, leaders should be the best examples of principled and 
disciplined conduct (African National Congress National Executive 
Committee, 2005).  
 
Ngesi (2014,16) in his research on the rhetorical meaning of collective leadership says 
this is a normative definition of what constitutes leaders of the ANC, prescribing the 
rules to be followed by everyone who occupies a leadership position in the party and 
the ANC president is then expected to embody all the above-mentioned qualities. 
Ngesi (2014) says that however, it does not prohibit an ANC president from having  
leeway or taking an initiative provided that this is done in the interest and within the 
confines of the constitutional structures of the party (Stengel 2010 in Ngesi 2014), 
which can then be linked to principles of good governance.   
 
Good governance theory 
 
According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation governance is the:  
 
provision of the political, social and economic goods that any citizen has the 
right to expect from his or her state, and that any state has the responsibility to 
deliver to its citizens (Governance, 2014).  
 
The foundation awards the $5 million Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African 
Leadership to African leaders who have developed their countries and left power in 
the last three years after fulfiling their constitutional mandate. The foundation also 
publishes the annual Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) that evaluates 
governance in Africa within four conceptual categories: safety and rule of law, 
participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human 
development. This means that a well governed country would have high levels of the 
categories used.  
 
To evaluate each country, the IIAG breaks down safety and law by  scoring rule of 
law, accountability, personal safety and national security (Governance 2014), The 
section on participation and human rights looks at participation in free and fair 
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elections, power to govern to political rights; allowance of freedom of and 
association, civil liberties and freedom of expression, gender equality and others.  
 
The sustainable economic opportunity category looks at public management, 
openness and competitiveness of the business environment, good infrastructure and 
well functioning rural areas and policies. The last category looks at human 
development that includes social and welfare regime, education provision and quality, 
health and sanitation (Governance 2014). 
 
The IIAG and other similar statistical instruments rely on the concept of good 
governance and accordingly, South Africa is ranked fourth with an overall score of 
73.3 out of 100 just below Botswana, Cabo Verde and Mauritius respectively.  
 
Over two five-year periods (2005-2009 and 2009-2013), the IIAG found that South 
Africa’s overall governance level has shown improvement in the past five years 
compared to deterioration in the previous five years. Also there has been an 
improvement in human development. There has been less deterioration in the safety 
and rule of law category in the most recent five years in comparison to the previous 
five-year period (Governance, 2014). But there IIAG says there has been more 
deterioration in participation and human rights category in the most recent five years 
in comparison to the previous five-year period. There has also been less improvement 
in the sustainable economic opportunity category in the most recent five years in 
comparison to the previous five-year period (Governance 2014). 
 
The conceptual framework that the IIAG uses is based on good governance theory 
and research by Gisselquist (2012) comparing multilateral, regional and continental 
institutions of their understanding of good governance found they all revolve around 
these categories: democracy, representation, human rights, rule of law, efficient and 
effective public management, transparency and accountability in particular 
institutions, human development, predictability and openness.  
 
Gisselquist (2012) says those who see good governance agenda as a worthy goal but 
also as a means through which to impact a variety of other outcomes, particularly 
economic growth and development. In poorly governed countries, it is argued, corrupt 
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bureaucrats and politicians baldly hinder development efforts by stealing aid 
contributions or misdirecting them into unproductive activities. Less obvious but 
equally pernicious, governments that are not accountable to their citizens and with 
inefficient bureaucracies and weak institutions are unwilling or unable to formulate 
and implement pro-growth and pro-poor policies. 
 
But opponents of the good governance agenda, on the other hand, raise strong 
challenges. Critics, especially in aid-recipient countries, argue that the use of 
governance criteria in the allocation of foreign aid effectively introduces political 
conditionalities and imposes Western liberal models of democracy (see Nanda 2006; 
NEPAD 2007: 3-4). Grindle (2004) points out that the good governance agenda is a 
poor guide for policy because it is ad hoc, ‘unrealistically long’, and not attuned 
(Kuhn 2014) to issues of sequencing and historical development (see also Booth 
2011). Along related lines, Andrews (2008: 380) notes that prevailing models of 
government effectiveness are ‘like telling developing countries that the way to 
develop is to become developed’ and that the ‘one-way-best model’ of governance 
ignores institutional variation across well-governed states (see Pritchett and Woolcock 
2004). 
 
To evaluate media representation of political leadership and governance, this research 
will have to look at political reporting or at least writing about politics, which falls 
broadly under political journalism. This type of journalism is most concerced with 
what leaders do and why they do what they do and in the case of South Africa, 
playing their part in the democratic dispensation as epitomised by similar traditions in 
other countries (Botswana, Namibia, the United States and the United Kingdom) with 
freedom of the press and are similarly ranked by Reporters Without Borders (see 
https://rsf.org/en/ranking) and  and the next section explains the research design and 
methodology. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 
This report uses quantitative content analysis to deconstruct newspaper articles from 
four major national weekend newspapers in South Africa - City Press, Mail and 
Guardian, The Sunday Independent and the Sunday Times and later discusses the 
manifest themes and ideas.  
 
Prasad (2008) describes content analysis as a scientific study of content of 
communication, which is a versatile tool for social science and media researchers and 
has been in use for decades. Considered an unobtrusive method of social research, 
Bernard Berelson in his Content analysis in Communication Research (1952) quoted 
in Prasad (2008) described content analysis as a research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. 
Due to systematisation, content analysis then analyses the form and substance of 
communication or as Holsti (1968) in Prasad (2008), the technique allows for making 
inferences to identify specified characteristics of content. Therefore, underlying 
meanings and ideas are revealed through analysing patterns in elements of the text, 
such as words or phrases (Yang, 2008, p. 689) and these texts are empirically coded 
based on a researcher-created coding system in order to make observations about the 
messages conveyed (Babbie, 1999, 286).  
 
Furthermore, Prasad (2008) added that content analysis conforms to basic principles 
of scientific method including objectivity, meaning that the analysis is pursued 
through explicit rules to enable the researcher to obtain the same results from the 
same documents. The systematisation determines the inclusion or exclusion using 
consistently applied rules to avoid only including materials, which support the 
researcher’s ideas, and finally, the generalisability of the results can be applied to 
other similar situations (Prasad, 2008). 
 
The advantages include the ability to deal with large volumes of data, which is a 
laborious process, but easy to do and it is also requires minimum capital investment. 
But the limitations of content analysis include inferences being limited to the content 
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of the text only and also symbols are processes and coded according to the attribution 
given by the researcher (Prasad, 2008).  
 
Overall Design of the Study 
 
The texts, all electronic, were collected through the SABINET online SA Media 
database collected by the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein. 
 
In order to find material related to the theme of political leadership during Zuma’s 
presidency key search terms were inputted including, “Zuma leadership”, “ANC 
leadership”, “Zuma governance”, within the following dates – 1 December 2007 and 
31 January 2013. This period marks Zuma becoming ANC president for the first time 
and also the first few years of the of his state presidency. It also covers the lead up to 
his second ANC win at Mangaung.  
 
Once the search results came up, only articles from the four chosen newspapers, City 
Press, Mail and Guardian, the Sunday Independent and the Sunday Times, were 
downloaded in PDF format, grouped according to the newspaper publication, and 
placed in folders. Only articles covering the first 25 search webpages were chosen due 
to time constraints resulting in approximately 850 articles being used for analysis. 
Also further disaggregation took place through removal of cartoons and articles that 
were not in line with the search terms.  
 
All the articles were catalogued in an Excel sheet according to type with the date, 
author, SA Media article ID and headline. 
 
Furthermore, each set of articles were read and further disaggregated by relevance and 
marked for use or not. Those that were marked for use were then read further and 
highlighted in different colours and notes made in the PDF regarding key terms and 
argument around political leadership in South Africa.  
 
The marked, highlighted articles were then further coded and filed in an Excel sheet 
according to date, author, article ID and headline and additionally an evaluation and 
quotation.  
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To distinguish the types of articles from each other, an evaluation was made on basic 
features that are prevalent in South African newspapers. Not all articles were easy to 
separate; therefore, ‘comment, opinion and column’ articles were all renamed 
‘opinion’. ‘News articles’, ‘letters’ and ‘editorials’ were left as separate categories. 
However, in some instances, news articles that were more analysis-focused were then 
re-identified as opinion.  
 
A news article, traditionally, has the following features: it is an upside-down pyramid 
with the most important information at the beginning. Other features are the name of 
the reporter, title and follows the 5 Ws and H (who, what, when, when, where and 
how) model and focuses on current events and usually gets the views of all sides. The 
written piece will tend to smaller in size compared to features and is mostly reportage. 
On the other hand, opinion includes comment, features, columns are longer and allow 
the discretion of the writer or editor, and can take positions on any subject (see 
Figures 1 to 3).  
 
Figure 1: Example of news article on the front page of a newspaper 
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Figure 2: Example of a feature, column or opinion article 
 
 
Figure 3: Examples of editorial and letters on the inside of a newspaper 
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Initially, the evaluation of the coded articles relied on Masciulli, Molchanov and 
Knight (2013); Helms (2012), and McAllister’s (2007) literature on political 
leadership such as:  
• Personality and traits of leader  
• His followers’ character and actions  
• Responsibility of a leader  
• Effectiveness of leader  
• Problem solving 
• Leader’s interpretive judgment  
• Effects of leadership by specific individual or collective 
 
But as the results show below other themes and ideas were found and these included: 
 
• Acceptance of lack of leadership or low level expectations, a lack of decision 
making, sitting on the fence, a watch and wait approach and political will 
• The actions of supporters, allies or enemies in political battles 
• Showing leadership in certain areas/leadership of convenience/for personal 
gain 
• How Zuma should exercise his power as president or how he should be as 
president or what is presidential. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS FROM COUNTING AND FILTERING  
Due to the counting involved in content analysis and subsequent filtering into 
categories, the results below start from the full sample collected to its breakdowns.  
 
First level evaluation: full sample 
 
Figure 4: Sample of published articles (n=820) 
 
 
Table 1: Total number of published articles by newspaper 
 
City Press 
Mail and 
Guardian 
Sunday 
Independent 
Sunday 
Times 
2007 16 12 15 25 
2008 27 72 33 35 
2009 25 36 28 34 
2010 12 28 48 18 
2011 11 28 36 66 
2012 38 35 52 76 
2013 2 3 4 5 
 
When the sample of collected articles, totalling 820, from SA Media are 
disaggregated by year of publication, the most active year is 2012. About 201 articles 
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were published in 2012, followed by 2008 with 167 and then 2011 with 141 and 2009. 
2012 was the year when the ANC’s Mangaung elective conference took place and 
President Zuma was re-elected for a second term as leader of the ANC. 2008 is the 
year that the former president Thabo Mbeki was recalled by the ANC but also a year 
where Zuma was fully in charge of the ANC after his election in Polokwane in 2007. 
2009 is another pivotal year, as Zuma became president of South Africa.  
 
When viewed per newspaper, the City Press seems to have published more articles in 
2012 on Zuma’s leadership, followed by the year 2008 with 27 and lastly 2009 with 
25 articles.  
 
The Mail and Guardian published most on the topic in 2008 with 72 articles and then 
followed by 2009 with 36 and 2012 with 35.  
 
The Sunday Independent published its most articles in 2012 (52), followed by 2010 
with 48 and then 2011 with 36 articles. The Sunday Times published the most out of 
all the newspapers covered here in 2012 with 76 articles, followed by 2011 with 66 
articles and 2008 with 35.  
 
All newspapers seem to be pointing to the period 2008 to 2012 as an important time 
when editors, reporters, politicians as well the public were strongly engaged in a 
debate or discussion about political leadership.  
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Figure 5: Total number of newspaper articles by type  (n=820) 
 
 
Table 2: Breakdown of newspaper articles by published newspaper 
 
 
City Press Mail and 
Guardian 
Sunday 
Independent 
Sunday 
Times 
Editorial 12 28 14 27 
Letter 20 35 21 7 
News analysis 17 24 11 13 
News article 48 98 106 135 
Opinion 35 33 67 53 
Unidentified       1 
 
When disaggregating by text type, the largest numbers of texts found are news articles 
numbering 387, followed by 188 opinions, 83 letters, 81 editorials, 65 news analysis 
pieces and one unclassified article.  
 
All four newspapers produced more news articles than any other text type. The second 
largest amount were opinion pieces. The Sunday Independent published the most 
opinion pieces. The Sunday Independent and Sunday Times published more letters 
than anyone else with the Mail and Guardian published the most news analysis 
pieces, at almost double the amount. To get to the point of analysis of relevant 
articles, a second disaggregation took place, resulting in 179 articles.  
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Second level evaluation: disaggregated sample 
 
Of the 179 coded articles that are being used for analysis, most came from the Sunday 
Times (54), followed by the Mail and Guardian (45), the Sunday Independent (41) 
and the City Press (39) (see Table 3). Of the 179 articles chosen for analysis, the most 
number were opinion (85), followed by news articles (45), editorial (29) and letters 
(20) (see Table 4) and the pattern is similar by newspaper breakdown.  
 
Table 3: Total number of coded and analysed articles by newspaper and year 
(n=179) 
 
City 
Press 
Mail and 
Guardian 
Sunday 
Independent 
Sunday 
Times 
Total 
2007 7 1 2 5 15 
2008 6 8 5 5 24 
2009 10 11 9 8 38 
2010 4 6 19 10 39 
2011 3 9 4 11 27 
2012 9 10 1 13 33 
2013   1 2 3 
Sample 39 45 41 54 179 
 
Table 4: Total number of coded and analysed articles by newspaper and article type 
 City 
Press 
Mail and 
Guardian 
Sunday 
Independent 
Sunday 
Times 
Total 
News 
article 
4 11 11 19 45 
Opinion 22 16 21 26 85 
Letter 5 10 5 0 20 
Editorial 8 8 4 9 29 
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Third level evaluation: Frequency of themes to be discussed 
 
After evaluation of the coded articles, discussion heavily emphasises personality and 
comparison of leader or leadership, followed by a strong focus on the promises and 
results of the leadership of Zuma, the third most discussed area is how South Africa 
should be led and finally what leadership really means. Another category (see Figure 
6). 
 
Figure 6: Main recurring thematic themes in analysis 
 
 
Breakdown by newspaper shows that in the City Press, personality is at the forefront 
followed by the definition of leadership, how to lead South Africa and the promises 
and results of Zuma’s leadership (Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: City Press main recurring themes in analysis 
 
 
The Mail and Guardian, also heavily focuses on personality, followed by the 
promises and results of Zuma’s leadership, how to lead South Africa and lastly, what 
leadership is (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Mail and Guardian main recurring themes in analysis 
 
In the Sunday Independent, there was almost an equal number of articles focused on 
personality and promises and results of Zuma’s leadership followed by how to lead 
the country and lastly, the definitions of leadership (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9: Sunday Independent recurring themes in analysis 
 
 
In the Sunday Times, more articles focused personality, followed by the promises and 
results of Zuma’s leadership, followed by how to lead SA and discussion of what 
leadership is (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10: Sunday Times recurring themes in analysis 
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The thematic categories for discussion and a timeline of political events  
Before discussing the various categories that came up frequently in the findings 
above, a timeline assessment shows that over time the focus of newspapers changed in 
the case of the City Press, it focused on personality and what Zuma would be 
expected to bring as president of the ANC. In 2008, the paper had more articles on 
how the country could be led and what is needed. In 2009, the focus shifted back to 
personality, and then in 2010 the focus went to defining leadership and in 2011, there 
was a shift again towards personality and the leadership definition and finally in 2012 
most focus was on leadership itself.  
 
The Mail and Guardian also focused on personality in 2007 and 2008. In the latter 
year there was a focus on leadership definition as well. In 2009, there was a shift 
towards how to lead, leadership definition and personality and in 2010, the focus 
shifted to the results of Zuma’s leadership and personality whilst 2011 focused on 
how to lead and the results of Zuma’s leadership and later, 2012 was focused on 
personality and results.  
 
In the Sunday Independent, December 2007 focused on personality and similarly for 
2008. In 2009, the conversation moved to how to lead and reflections on Zuma’s 
leading the country. In 2010, personality came back followed by the results of Zuma’s 
leadership and how to lead. In 2012, the focus was on defining leadership.  
 
The Sunday Times also focused on personality in 2007 and 2008. In addition, 2008 
also focused on results of leadership by Zuma and how to lead. 2009 to 2012 was 
focused mainly on personality. 2010 also focused on results and leadership definition, 
2011 the results of Zuma’s leadership.   
The thematic categories discussed in the newspapers then merge into the broader 
context of the period. To clarify why these categories were the main focus the 
timeline shows us that the period begins with the ANC elective conference in 
Polokwane in 2007, which led to Zuma’s election as ANC president and then Zuma 
was recharged with corruption in the same month of December by the National 
Prosecuting Authority. This was followed in early 2008 by a decision to drop charges 
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against Zuma by the then acting National Director of Public Prosecutions, Mokotedi 
Mpshe that paved the way for Zuma to be available to be elected president of the 
country by the National Assembly in May 2009 after the national elections, if his 
party won a majority of votes. Still in 2008 major xenophobic violence broke out 
when South Africans attacked foreign African nationals across the country and the 
state’s electricity utility company, Eskom, began blackouts due to low capacity 
because of a poor government decision in the 1990s that had stopped a process to 
increase capacity and build new power stations – the blackouts or ‘load shedding’ in 
South African parlance lasted throughout Zuma’s first term as president and had a big 
impact on economic stability and exacerbated the already low economic recovery. 
 
Later in September of 2008, following Mbeki’s forced resignation as president of the 
country through a ‘recall’ by his party, half the Cabinet resigned and the then defence 
minister and former national chairman of the ANC, Mosiuoa Lekota and former 
Gauteng premier Mbhazima Shilowa, allies of Mbeki, formed a breakaway party from 
the ANC, the Congress of the People (COPE) and contested in the national elections 
of 2009 and won almost a tenth of the vote spooking the ANC, whose share of the 
vote declined.  
 
In the same period, the Great Recession started and sent the economy of South Africa 
into the doldrums with growth at approximately -1.7% at the end of 2009  (Statistics 
South Africa, 2010). On a more positive note, South Africa hosted the Soccer World 
Cup in 2010, which saw a recovery in the economy and in 2011; Zuma saw his 
presidential approval ratings become positive with the Afrobarometer public opinion 
survey showing that almost 68% of South Africans approved of his performance as 
president of the country (Lekalake, 2015). 
 
But the positivity was not to last when between 10 August and 20 September 2012, a 
mining strike broke out in Marikana, near Rustenburg in the platinum belt of the 
North West province over demands for substantially higher wages at the platinum 
mine of Lonmin. Violence then broke out amongst miners resulting in about eight 
people, including security guards and other miners killed by strikers on 11 August and 
subsequently a massacre of 41 people occurred on 16 August, after failed negotiations 
between police and miners to stop protesting with weapons resulting in a 
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confrontation. The miners were gunned down by the police on live television – this 
was the single most lethal use of force by South African security forces against 
civilians since the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre.  
 
Finally, the now infamous 2012 ended with the ANC’s elective conference in 
Mangaung that resulted in President Zuma being re-elected as president of the party 
after defeating his deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe in an uneven contest. Motlanthe, who 
had been president for a short period after the ouster of Mbeki in 2008, was replaced 
by Cyril Ramaphosa, who controversially was a board member at Lonmin during the 
Marikana Massacre. Ramaphosa is a former unionist leader of the NUM and 
businessman and attorney who has had a respectable political reputation and is a 
former secretary general of the ANC, chief negotiator in the CODESA talks of the 
early 1990s that led to democracy and also led the Constitutional Assembly that 
created the Constitution and the new structure of the state and government.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the four thematic areas found during the evaluation of the data 
in the previous chapter. The four major findings include: personalisation of political 
leadership; what political leadership should be doing; how to lead; and how President 
Zuma led between 2007 and 2013.  
 
What the results show is that discussion of leadership is fraught with assumptions and 
a lack of clarity. Discussants grasp for norms and ideals of how leadership should be, 
that is the rules of leading and how a leader should act. These norms then tend to be 
personality-driven, reflecting the views of those inside the ANC, government, the 
opposition parties, parliament, political analysts, reporters and editors. They also 
reflect the evaluation of personalities of previous leaders in South Africa and 
elsewhere in the world.  
 
These norms then also tend to link to the idea of democracy as envisaged in the 
constitutional structure of power in the country but also these norms link to what the 
governing party, the ANC thinks of leadership and additionally, how the struggle for 
democracy was conducted during apartheid. In the three strands of the constitutional 
state, the ANC and the conduct of the struggle for democracy, there is and was an 
underlying idea that leaders have to have moral suasion. They have to get support 
through elections by ordinary citizens or members of parties and have to be 
accountable at all times and an idea emerged of collective responsibility, not only of 
the overall leader but also those in other positions, whether as president with cabinet 
ministers in the case of government or in the United Democratic Front multiple 
committees and programmes or in the ANC collective leadership structure, the 
national executive committee. Moreover, in the case of President Zuma, his most 
important quality is being leader of the ANC and secondly leader of society as 
president of the country, which is discussed further in the section on his stewardship. 
This led to the idea that there are expectations and this emerged in the assessment 
drawing from all the material that is discussed below and most writing on leaders talk 
about what people want from incoming new leaders, such as when Zuma took over as 
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president. These expectations also lead norms to the discussion on democracy and 
news media that is, the leader has to be held accountable.  
 
The normative ideas of leadership are then muddled in newspapers in that the 
evaluation shows that it is hard for commentators and writers to articulate leadership 
on its own. Therefore, it is easier for the writers to compare current and preceding 
leaders by highlighting key areas of difference between them. In addition, the key to 
the discussion is the person who leads and his leadership at a specific time. In the case 
of the Zuma period, the evaluation by writers would tend to look at who had 
coalesced around him or opposed him. 
 
Furthermore, few writers have their own view but rely on comparison and come up 
with criteria for leadership from that comparison. In the case of the Zuma period, 
there are pre-existing themes through which leadership is evaluated, especially key 
moments such as solving the ANC and Inkatha conflict in KwaZulu-Natal in the 
1990s, his scandals and decisions in the presidency.   
 
Therefore, the discussion of leadership in South African print media is implicit and 
has signposts, for example, “he does not do this…” points to norms and what they are 
and therefore “a leader has to be…”   
 
Personalization of leadership  
 
As discussed in the theory section, McAllister (2007) determines personalisation as 
‘the’ central feature of politics, where the coverage of politics focuses on the 
personality of leaders because they have a higher entertainment value and economic 
potential than any balanced analysis of competing policy agendas. But Pakulski 
(2013) found that even though the media personalises politics, politicians are not 
innocent in this regard because they use the access to the media to develop their 
profiles. 
 
Therefore, personalisation in newspapers has a far higher entertainment value and 
helps sell copies, instead of focusing on the nitty gritty of policy. But it also allows 
the newspapers under assessment to set the news agenda and bring to the ordinary 
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person human relations in power. Because of the entertainment value of political 
personalities and all that happens in political office, ordinary people can be engaged 
much more easily and may even look forward to the ‘next episode’. 
 
On the other hand, personalisation of politics and public policy causes a lack of focus 
on the hard work and complexity of governing and gives less information on the 
processes needed to lead effectively. A major critique of weekend newspapers is that 
we find out how politicians are behaving but have no idea when they get time to do 
their actual work of governing or opposing. It is much more easy to report or 
comment on a politician who is scandalous and to make that a morality tale.  
 
Moreover, when legislation is introduced and processed through Parliament, news 
media tends to only focus on the disagreements and personality-driven contests. This 
may leave an ordinary person without clarity on why legislation is defective or 
necessary and how it works. In this case there is selective picking of information.  
 
Beyond legislation is, personalisation depends strongly on the extent of leadership 
problems that a president faces such a Jacob Zuma. These problems then also tended 
to then be discussed as an aspect of Zuma’s personality rather than as issues of the 
ANC collective leadership group. To clarify this means structural issues and problems 
in governing or not being accountable whether by a minister or the president are 
represented in the news media as matters about the personality of the leader. 
Additionally, Zuma’s leadership particularly is also discussed as if the ANC does not 
exist and Zuma is focused on from a national level, his presidency of the country but 
this blurs the full picture because a leader like Zuma could only have emerged from 
the ANC because of the processes of that organisation. Since the state of the 
organisation is not made a core part of the explanation, the discussions quickly 
became about Zuma instead of the party and the collective leadership group’s failures.  
 
It is thus important to evaluate the personalisation of leadership because it could 
clarify what is valued by journalists and commentators, and what they think 
leadership ought to look like and also it may show whether they reflect what society 
wants but also whether journalism influences society in turn on the ‘look’ a leader 
must have. It can also give us a window into politicians and public policy officials’ 
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views of leadership, especially those who write to editors or are quoted in 
newspapers. It may also open a window into the relationships between the media and 
politicians as well and who is more valued as entertainment than another.  
 
Therefore, this section focuses on the type of personality a leader has to have in party 
politics and government in South Africa, as set out by journalists and commentators 
but also the extent to which the personality of the politician overdetermines the 
discussion.  
 
The assessment shows that writers focus on normative personality traits and this 
corroborated by other research. Felton (2016) in her thesis, evaluating IDASA and 
Afrobarometer public opinion perceptions survey data of South African presidents 
from 1997 to 2015 found that there is a  heavy focus on the personality of leaders 
amongst adult citizens of the country. Felton found that over time in South Africa, 
personal traits became more important and stronger during the Zuma presidency in the 
evaluation of the president by the public during the 1997-2015 period (Felton, 2016) 
and this may be driven by the news media.  
 
In addition, it would seem the template that most writers have in mind is that of 
Nelson Mandela with the emphasis on rationality, morality, commitment and 
transparency. Furthermore, a leader must show concern and interest physically by 
listening closely and not being afraid of ordinary people.  
 
Also, writers in all the newspapers seem to have similar views and sometimes mirror 
each other. These views tend to come from, specifically, the editors and regular 
columnists, but a few letters also show similar views; this may be a function of editors 
choosing to publish what is similar to their own personal views. When it comes to 
reporters, a similar approach is taken, where reporters will emphasise the editorial 
position of their newspaper based on choice of interviewee or whom they quote.  
 
A 2007 article sets the tone for how the discussion of personalisation of leadership 
took place during the period covered. ‘Oriang (2007) wrote that any leader who takes 
over power will be judged based on their personal and public history. She added that 
their mistakes and irresponsible actions in the past would haunt that leader when in 
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power. When discussing the possibility of Zuma becoming president, ‘Oriang (2007) 
emphasised that the personal actions of a leader should not be the same as an ordinary 
person, implying that an ordinary person can make mistakes and not be judged as 
harshly by society but leaders are different:  
 
There should be a difference between Zuma and your typical villager. At the 
time of the incident that has come to define him, he was deputy president of 
the ANC. He once headed the Aids council. The judgment in the circles that I 
move in was instant, unanimous and far short of complimentary: "My God, if 
this is the face of Africa's leadership, where shall we hide?" Some things know 
no boundaries. A Zuma presidency would not necessarily be the worst thing to 
hit Africa. Our continent has had its share of psychopaths and mass killers 
occupying the state house. His confession is child's play in comparison. And 
he probably has leadership skills that have not received as much coverage 
abroad as his peccadilloes. Popularity does not excuse irresponsible behaviour, 
'Oriang (2007).  
 
Taking a slightly different view to ‘Oriang, UCT sociology professor, Xolela Mangcu 
agreed that private and public morality matters, but what you do in private should not 
affect the public and as a leader you should be careful who you surround yourself 
with (Mangcu X. , 2007): 
 
The Zuma affair raises an interesting question about the relationship between 
the private and public morality of elected officials. My own view is that while 
a leader's private morality may compromise his ability to lead, a leader's 
public morality may not always be reduced to his private morality. An 
example of a leader whose private morality affected his public duties was the 
19th century US president Martin Van Buren. Van Buren was known to 
disappear from work for weeks on end on account of his drinking. But equally 
there are those leaders - Franklin Roosevelt, John F Kennedy, Francois 
Mitterand, Bill Clinton whose questionable relationships never detracted from 
their public achievements, Mangcu said. 
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But Monare (2010), a former Sunday Independent editor, says a leader must not 
equate the public institution of his office (The Presidency) and his person (private 
life) because if he does anything negative it will insult the self-respect of the country. 
Monare means that the president has a representational aspect – he embodies the 
government and represents the coutry, so his personal actions and misadventures 
bring disrepute to the office, not just to himself: 
 
... the crux of the concern is when such actions negatively affect the dignity of 
the office of the president and, by extension, the country. When cartoonists 
start transforming the tower of the Union Buildings into an erect penis, it is 
clear that the office - and not necessarily the incumbent – has been dented. 
When jokers start changing the name of the Union Buildings into Union 
Babies, the stature of that office is badly smashed. When some satirists start 
talking about Zuma delivering the Sex of the Nation next week, then we must 
really worry about the status and reputation of the presidency. The biggest 
mistake Zuma is making is to confuse the office with the person holding it. 
We are talking about the institution that resembles the dignity of the nation. 
The office that embodies the decorum, the grandeur, the self-respect of South 
Africa (Monare, 2010). 
 
Taking the ‘Oriang, Mangcu and Monare views further, editor Tabane (2008) and 
academic Gobodo-Madikizela (2009) say a leader must have moral authority, a 
conscience, commitment, respect and the ability to build up tolerance in his society. 
Furthermore, Carter (2008) speaks of a principled centre and high morals: 
 
The essence of Nelson Mandela's leadership was moral authority and a keen 
consciousness of the potential for violence and destructiveness in our society. 
Mandela recognised his role in building a culture of tolerance. In contrast, 
under Jacob Zuma's leadership, political intolerance in our society seems to 
have deepened. In speeches delivered to crowds outside his court appearances, 
in statements by leaders of the ANC alliance partners and in the behaviour of 
Zuma's disciples, the message conveyed under Zuma's leadership has been one 
of intolerance and a spirit of protest that has permeated many sectors of civil 
society, rupturing the sense of responsible citizenship among some ANC 
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members entrusted with authority in institutions such as schools. At a time 
when we need leaders who will be moral role models for the next generation 
of leaders, one wonders what the future holds when our president's strength of 
popularity is not matched by the strength of his reputation for moral stature”, 
said Gobodo-Madikizela (2009). 
 
Concurring, Habib (2010), a political analyst and academic, emphatically says that 
personal problems have no place in leadership: 
 
The revelations of President Jacob Zuma's extramarital affairs have helped 
distract the nation from the more serious business at hand - his ability to 
govern… instead of debating the merits of the government's policies, or even 
the nation's woes, the citizens are focused on the president’s sexual 
escapades...with all these nagging questions gnawing at his mind and 
conscience, how does Zuma manage to do the challenging job of running a 
country? asked Habib (2010). 
 
Habib’s question brings up Mkhabela’s understanding that a South African leader 
must lead by force of example and have stature (Mkhabela, 2010):  
 
Given his well-publicised personal problems and his troubled start as 
president, it is hard to believe that perceptions of him [Zuma] as a leader by 
his ministers - some of whom wept when their former boss was toppled - are 
as honourable as one would wish. At the heart of continued controversies 
around him, his family, his leadership in government and the ANC is his 
ability to lead by force of example. It appears his stature as a force for 
example evaporated quicker than mist in the face of a powerful sun when he 
took over the reins. His undertaking to lead Madiba style - subtext to eschew 
the much maligned Thabo Mbeki's style of centralising power - held the 
promise for a greater term in office. But the promise seems to have ended at 
being consultative has become a subject of his inauguration. His foremost 
attribute has become a sophisticated way to suggest indecisiveness, 
(Mkhabela, 2010). 
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While the past is important in how debates take place about the personality of leaders, 
other commentators laid out the personality traits similar to Mkhabela (2010) that they 
deemed important. Therefore, the personality characteristics that a leader requires 
include showing warmth and closeness to ordinary party members and also to care 
about their personal concerns (Motshekga, 2007). Close to this view of ANC NEC 
member and government minister, Angie Motshekga, is that of the former premier of 
KwaZulu-Natal [Zweli] Mkhize (2009), who says that an individual leader should 
have humility and be consultative so that the party’s leadership collective can support 
that individual leader and enhance his best qualities:  
 
Zuma was elected to deputise and strengthen Mbeki's leadership collective 
because of his excellent human relations, listening skills and capacity to unify. 
It was felt that, inevitably, Zuma's leadership would be needed to refocus 
attention on the vision of the ANC to build a compassionate and caring society 
once the transformation agenda was in place after Mbeki. Any perceived 
weaknesses are outweighed by his [Zuma] mature leadership style and the 
stability and spirit of friendship the country will enjoy under it. His strength is 
his humility and welcoming style that inspires a willingness to contribute to 
positive achievement for the good of our country, said Mkhize (2009). 
 
Writing along the same lines as Mkhize is Mangcu, saying that a leader must always 
be aware of his organisation’s collective psyche and give ideas to steer it forward. In 
contrast, Mangcu (2012) says the ANC under Zuma is going through a leaderless 
period of drift and realignment similar to the 1950s under James Moroka because of a 
lack of ideas and therefore a lack of consciousness of the soul of the party to steer it 
into the future.  
 
In opposition to Mangcu’s argument of a leader being aware of what the political 
party members want, Richard Calland admires Zuma’s strengths and writes that a 
political leader must go beyond intellect, and must be instinctive, savvy and be 
unencumbered to make decisions (Calland, 2008):   
 
There is more than a touch of Ronald Reagan - or even, dare one say it, 
George W Bush - in Jacob Zuma. Apparently happily unencumbered by the 
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need to demonstrate a towering intellectual faculty, he is an archetypal 
instinctive politician - streetwise, savvy and not to be underestimated. His 
greatest political strength is simply: he is not Thabo Mbeki, (Calland, 2008).  
 
Additional to having good instincts as a leader, a Mail and Guardian editorial from 
October 2008 asked that leaders seek consensus, acknowledge their errors but also be 
able to apologise for their mistakes. Mac Maharaj, Mandela’s former transport 
minister and later Zuma’s presidential spokesman agreed with the view of the Mail 
and Guardian and said his boss was a respectful good listener who was unafraid to 
acknowledge his past mistakes (Maharaj, 2009): 
 
For all his [Zuma] faults, including his deep social conservatism and weak 
grasp of policy, Zuma is a consensus politician who is quite different 
temperamentally from Mbeki the divider and polariser. He does not suffer, for 
example, from Mbeki's racial hang-ups. And in sharp contrast to Mbeki he has 
shown that he can acknowledge error and apologise (Call for Mr Cool, 2008). 
 
Ndlangisa (2009) spells out a further criterion for a leader, that they should have a 
vision, message or belief system that will be implemented. At the same time 
Ndlangisa (2009) compares Zuma with Mandela and Mbeki, saying that Mandela 
projected himself as the president of reconciliation, Mbeki styled himself as a man of 
transformation and empowerment of previously, disadvantaged people:  
 
It is difficult to tell from Zuma’s state of the nation address what his broad 
vision is. It could very well be that he is telling us that he prefers a more 
pragmatic approach to governance and leadership - the sort of style that 
grapples with issues as they arise rather than one that follows hard and fast 
rules, (Ndlangisa, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, a leader, despite being charismatic, should be seen physically leading 
from the front, always on top of issues and always involved, according to Mofokeng 
(2009) and Sefara (2009). This means a leader may not hide and not comment on 
issues that affect the country and his party.  
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For Mataboge (2011), citizens must know the leader’s positions and know them to be 
rational by telling citizens. A leader should also not be indecisive, irrational and 
paranoid (Mataboge 2011).  
  
Several warnings are also mentioned about how a president conducts himself in office 
and personally. For Pakkies (2008), in a letter to the editor, writes that a leader should 
not manipulate emotions and expectations:  
 
Zuma will have difficulty maintaining unity in the ANC. He got into power by 
manipulating the emotions and expectations of the people, portraying himself 
as a victim of the "political conspiracy (Pakkies, 2008).  
 
Others also said that leading government does not require charm, but needs 
management skills and vision period (Mtolo 2010, Morudu  2010, Wonci 2010): 
 
Unlike his predecessors, Zuma is not a visionary leader. We seem to expect 
too much from him. A good underground operative, a schemer, a populist and 
a charmer, but not a statesman, strategist, unifier or a skilled manager like 
Mbeki. Leading government requires managerial skills more than charm and 
the ability to sing revolutionary songs. Government is complex.... Mandela 
was a charmer, a bulldozer and a campaigner, Walter Sisulu, a strategist and 
Govan Mbeki a theoretician... Zuma is out of touch with himself. Populists 
rely on promises (Mtolo, 2010).  
 
Taking it further, former Mail and Guardian editor, Nic Dawes in an opinion article 
in 2008 wrote that a leader needs to avoid cults of personality and in an editorial in 
March of that year spoke about leaders avoiding being “everything to everyone” 
interpreting a letter by former president Thabo Mbeki to Zuma (It's easier to do the 
right thing, 2011):  
 
He [Mbeki] goes on to ask Zuma if he can recall a moment when the 
movement, in the thrall of such a "noxious phenomenon ... ceased to think, 
iscontent to act in the manner of the anointed 'personality', such as the late 
Kim Il-Sung, determined for the people of North Korea!" The implicit 
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comparison between Zuma and the North Korean dictator is strengthened 
when, after a page outlining how the ANC's leadership tradition has avoided 
hero-worship, Mbeki says: "I find it strange in the extreme that today cadres of 
our movement attach the label of a 'cult of personality' to me, and indeed 
publicly declare a determination 'to kill' to defend your own cause, the 
personal interests of 'the personality', Jacob Zuma." He then demands that 
Zuma "take all necessary measures" to stop party members from blaming their 
former president for everything they feel is wrong with the party and the 
country. Zuma, he says, must remind party members that the ANC's post-1994 
legacy is based on "collective decisions" and that he must prevent them from 
"abandoning their democratic obligations by falsely, and dishonestly 
pretending that, the goals of the national democratic revolution have been 
frustrated it they have been, by one individual Thabo Mbeki" (What Mbeki 
really said, 2008). 
 
Expectations of how you act as a leader also require personal depth, eloquence and 
transparency (Letsoalo 2010; Tabane, Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown, 
2012): 
 
The point of this regurgitation of history is that Mbeki governed and imposed 
his style and beliefs on the party for most of the two terms he served. By the 
time he left, we knew exactly what he thought of the major issues of the day, 
which is why he generated a substantial layer of critics who specialised in 
analysing his presidency. By contrast, Zuma is past the halfway stage of his 
first term and we still do not know where he really stands on any major issues. 
We have to make do with hints and actions that, now and then, allow us a 
glimpse of the man behind the grin and the dance, (Tabane, Uneasy lies the 
head that wears the crown, 2012).  
 
At the end of the day, what is significant is that the type of personality that South 
African journalists and commentators value is a leader they can love, be proud of, one 
who is respectful, compassionate, politically astute and grounded in the manner of 
Nelson Mandela (Makhanya 2007, Seepe 2009):  
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That Sunday happened long before we discovered the ogre that is Jacob Zuma, 
the ogre who this week might become the president of the ANC and, in 2009, 
the president of the republic. At that time Zuma seemed an affable, reasonable 
guy who we could all relate to. He was so different from Mbeki, who believed 
he had all the answers to all the questions all the time, and treated the other 45 
million South Africans with contempt. Zuma reminded us of our happier 
nascent years - the time when we had a leader who loved us and who we could 
love back. He led the singing at rallies and political funerals. He listened when 
people spoke. He spoke back with respect. He possessed that quintessential 
quality of leaders: empathy... two Zumas: There was the charming, politically 
astute and grounded leader - and then there was the bumbling servant of the 
Shaik family.... But Zuma is what he is – ethically retarded and prone to bad 
judgment, says Makhanya (2007).  
 
  
55  
 
The definition of leadership  
This section aims to clarify what the news media thinks is leadership, how it is shown 
or its actions and what it requires. In order to make it clear that the definition of 
leadership maybe fuzzy for commentators, the Mail and Guardian’s Tabane in 2011 
warned that South Africans do not know the type of leader they want and if citizens 
do not know, journalists will also struggle. He says the problem of defining what 
South Africans want lays in the worry over personalities and ideology in the political 
system and that there is really no difference amongst leaders since they come from the 
same tradition:  
 
When people in the ANC and outside say they do not want President Jacob 
Zuma to return for a second term and instead want a Tokyo Sexwale or a 
Kgalema Motlanthe, what is that they really want? Is it the quiet, dignified 
figure of Motlanthe they are smitten with or do they really believe that, 
politically and ideologically, he stands to offer something substantially 
different? What do Sexwale or Motlanthe stand for that Zuma does not already 
represent? (Tabane, Mail and Guardian, 2011). 
 
Similarly, to Tabane, Moya (2012) wrote that leadership is the courage to have 
convictions and vision at the risk of being unpopular. But he cautioned that in South 
Africa, there is no definition of leadership, and anything can pass as ‘leadership’ and 
anyone can pretend to be a ‘leader’:  
 
Leadership requires that we make less of brick-and-mortar projects than we 
currently do. They will lead us nowhere. The apartheid state created some of 
the best infrastructure, universities and, frankly, some of the best amenities in 
the developing world. But who among us will say that Hendrik Verwoerd or 
any of his successors were great leaders? Another thing about leadership is 
courage to have one's convictions even at the risk of being unpopular or going 
against the grain.  The late ANC president, Oliver Tambo, may have never 
built a single school in his hometown, but, his courage and vision made him an 
outstanding leader. Leaders must lead. They must have the courage of their 
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convictions. They must provide us with a vision of what might happen or 
where they might take us if we follow them. If they don't they are just office 
holders, (Moya, 2012) 
 
Clarifying the views of Tabane and Moya, similarly Ndletyana (2010) has argued 
there are criteria for leadership even if people are not sure and said that South 
Africans do not want philosopher-presidents (Mbeki) nor populists (Zuma) but a 
combination in the form of Mandela’s transformative leadership, that is, the 
combination of intellectual curiosity, empathy and instincts:  
 
The populist Zuma affirmed ANC's rank and file. The intellectual Mbeki had 
made [them] feel stupid with his erudite speeches and even seemed 
uncomfortable just addressing them. He was impatient with the singing, short 
on slogans and vacated the podium as soon as he finished his speech. The 
populist Zuma preferred slogans and singing to long speeches. Crowds love 
him and clamour for even more singing and dancing. Zuma affirms the 
ordinary folks, making them feel worthy when others had taken their illiteracy 
and simplicity as reasons to down upon them. In Zuma, ordinary folks saw 
themselves and celebrated: ‘Finally, someone who gets us!’ But, charismatic 
leaders are not necessarily populist. Nelson Mandela used his messianic 
stature to appeal to the better angels in us. His was transformative leadership. 
What benefit will Zuma's charisma be to South Africa? It is not clear yet 
where Zuma's presidency will lead us. At present, the signals are mixed, 
confirming and defying populist expectations all at once. Zuma seeks to 
reconfigure institutions to satisfy personal wants. The government is steered 
by mood swings: today it seeks to impress, tomorrow it just snubs. South 
Africa wants neither philosopher-presidents nor populists. South Africa yearns 
for leadership that combines both. Mandela was a perfect template: a 
combination of intellectual curiosity with empathy and instincts, (Ndletyana, 
2010).  
 
While Mandela’s leadership was transformative according to Ndletyana (2010), Du 
Preez (2010) argued for a simpler type, that of a chief executive, in the style of 
business.  
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Investopedia defines a chief executive officer as the highest ranking executive in an 
organisation, much like the president heads the government and executive of the 
country. And their primary responsibilities include making major decisions, managing 
overall operations and resources and acting as the main point of communications 
between the board of directors and corporate operations (think the Cabinet and civil 
service heads for the president). But chief executives, also set the tone and the vision 
for the organisation and similarly, in the case of the country, this is the job of the 
president (Investopedia, 2016). 
 
In addition, to being a chief executive, Makhanya said in 2010 that a president must 
lead and take clear positions, make decisions and charts a way forward for the 
country:  
 
South Africans are demanding much more than his [Zuma’s] affability. They 
want a president who leads and who is not afraid to take clear positions on 
issues. There is an increasing sense across classes and political affiliations that 
the current president is not that person. That he is not a decision maker and 
certainly not somebody who can chart a path. South Africa functions despite 
him rather than because of him. The way he has run the Presidency is exactly 
the same way he has run the ANC: by letting the factions and sub-factions 
fight it out until a winner emerges. (Makhanya, In the Presidency as in the 
ANC, a leader who just watches and waits, 2010) 
 
Using comparison, Mulholland (2012), said that great leaders exercise moral and 
effective leadership by inspiring, comforting and encouraging their people, led by 
example, have courage, commitment, honesty, dedication and awareness of the need 
for support from those they lead. He adds that great leadership leads to great results 
such as what Mandela, Roosevelt, Nehru and Churchill achieved when they were at 
the helm and led to progress in their countries through industry, commerce, politics 
and government: 
 
Zurna's role in South Africa sinks into insignificance. He is no Mandela, who 
gathered together in his fatherly embrace South Africans of all races and 
religions, imbuing them with hope for a peaceful and prosperous nation. He is 
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no Roosevelt who lifted not only his own country but the entire world out of a 
sickening depression, telling them to be not afraid as they had ‘nothing.to fear 
but fear itself’. He is no Winston Churchill who [defied] Adolf Hitler at the 
nadir of Britain's wartime fortunes. This is what great leaders do. They inspire, 
comfort and encourage their people. They also lead by example and who can 
claim that the moral examples established by Zuma are those which the people 
should follow? Does Zuma belong in this pantheon? (Mulholland, 2012).  
 
Beyond the criteria espoused by a number of commentators, focused on the Mandela 
type of leadership, others give more benchmarks. De Lille (2008) emphasises moral 
responsibility and encouraging tolerance, grasping at more Mandela-type criteria 
especially when a leader is seen as allowing violent rhetoric for political expediency. 
Patricia De Lille, at the time was the leader of the Independent Democrats and 
criticised Zuma for allowing his supporters to say whatever they liked including 
‘intolerance and war’ but then shifting his mind later. She said failure to reprimand 
followers: 
 
is nothing more than hypocrisy and poor leadership. These contradictions in 
leadership, where leaders condemn and then condone, where we speak out and 
then keep quiet are dangerous in a society with a culture of violence. We need 
to be building and encouraging tolerance. As leaders we have a moral 
responsibility to remind our supporters to be tolerant of those who have 
different political affiliations to our own - as is their democratic right, (De 
Lille P. , 2008). 
 
 Alongside De Lille’s views, Hlophe (2010) said the leader also shows leadership by 
acting against wrongdoers, thus showing they are in charge. In the case of the ANC 
under Zuma, Hlophe found that anybody in the ANC could do what he or she wanted 
because the centre of power was not holding and this cast doubt on whether, the 
current leader, Zuma had any ability to lead.  
 
The ‘free for all’ pronouncements by tripartite leaders created the salient 
perception that Zuma owed his position to certain political figures within the 
alliance. Thus, while Malema may not be ‘shaken’, he should consider two 
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points. First, Bantu Holomisa's case presents a relevant precedent for him. 
Second, his political behaviour has inadvertently built and consolidated a 
power bloc within the ANC against him. This bloc calls on Zuma to ‘show 
leadership’ on this matter, which is, to ‘deal with Malema’. And when Zuma 
acts against Malema, he will be consolidating his leadership and stature, 
(Hlophe, 2010). 
 
Beyond punishing transgressors using moral might, Mangcu argued that some other 
tools leaders should have in their shed include emotional intelligence, ethical-moral 
commitment, political willingness and institutional resources (Mangcu X. , How can 
we rescue ourselves from this mess?, 2011).  
 
For Mazi (2012), the most important thing is, simply, that a president does his job as 
required and expected by being consistent with policy as set out at the beginning of 
their term, such as for example creating jobs as promised. But Mzelemu (2009) wrote 
it cannot just be that simple, leaders have to have idealism and understand complex 
issues if they are to lead. In another comparison, Mzelemu says Zuma “is a loud 
nothing” who represents mediocre leadership while Obama is the ideal, as he 
understands the complex issues that afflict his nation.  In addition to idealism Maseti 
(2011), felt that leadership requires dynamism, intellectual, ideological and political 
zest to confront challenges. Similar criticism by De Lille and Hlophe is aimed at 
Zuma: 
 
...the style of the current leadership collective is characteristic of zig-zagging. 
Such a situation needs a wholesale rescue plan and it is incumbent upon the 
ANC members to correct it even if it means electing young and fresh leaders 
to take it over. South Africa needs a dynamic leadership that will have the 
necessary intellectual, ideological and political zest to confront the global 
challenges of poverty and huge socio-economic inequalities, (Maseti, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, for Sipuka (2012) leadership is toxic if it leaves South Africa or the 
organisation (the ANC) in anarchy, mired in scandals, on auto-pilot and not dealing 
with serious challenges on top of a bad image, mediocrity and institutionalising 
kleptocracy while being led by Zuma: 
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According to Whicker (1996), a toxic leader abuses the leader-follower 
relationship by leaving the group or organisation in a worse-off condition than 
when he/she joined it. President Zuma found both the ANC and government in 
much better positions than he will leave them. They say, a leader is as good as 
his people, surely we are no nation of fools, we deserve much better! (Sipuka, 
2012). 
 
Therefore, the solution to issues of toxic leadership and not doing one’s job is to face 
crises head on and seek solutions, according to Lindiwe Mazibuko, the DA’s 
parliamentary leader at the time:   
 
President Jacob Zuma has failed to demonstrate economic leadership in the 
midst of a global recession, and this is hindering job creation. For leaders this 
is the time to lead and to present clear, bold and decisive plans to reverse the 
threat of decline. To alter the negative trend of his presidency, Mr Zuma must 
make a final decision about what his government's economic policy is, 
(Mazibuko, Dithering Zuma must make a choice, 2012).  
 
Significantly, Mazibuko wrote that successful leaders are accountable in office and 
tend to synthesise transformative objectives with transactional skills through their 
power of vision, communication and emotional intelligence:  
 
There was, I saw, an unbroken thread within the wider context of what 
presidential leadership should look like. The coin of presidential leadership is 
the notion of accountability, the belief that the buck stops at my door. While 
transformative leaders inspire followers to transcend self-interest for the sake 
of a higher purpose, transactional leaders motivate followers by appealing to 
their self-interest. Most successful leaders in office tend to synthesise 
transformative objectives with transactional skills. Yet Zuma does not possess 
either skill set. Lacking the soft power of vision, communications and 
emotional intelligence, his responses to the Marikana tragedy and Nkandla 
were disgraceful, (Mazibuko, SA deserves much better, 2012). 
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How to lead 
 
Beyond the definition of leadership and the personality needed to lead, the success of 
a leader is understood through whether they know how to lead or not. This section 
seeks to lay out the criteria necessary to lead, who leads and other qualities such as 
decision making in general and the style of leading. 
 
For leaders to run an organization or country, they have to be, simply inspiring, 
repectable, reflective and up to the job and implement their programme, according to 
Monare in 2009. Monare was criticizing president Zuma, saying that ordinary people 
would never see him as leading if he focused on his self-pity, conspiracies, indecision 
and populism (Monare, The time for leadership is now, Mr Zuma, 2009): 
  
ANC president Jacob Zuma must stop the self-pity, the conspiratorial bunkum, 
the indecisive "ums" and "ahs" and his populist bull. He must stop singing, cut 
out the disproportionate laughter and display some inspiring leadership. That 
is, if he is serious about becoming a respectable head of state. So, if he 
believes he deserves...honours and responsibilities, Zuma - for a moment...just 
for a moment - must show them [South Africans] that he is up for the job. He 
needs to reflect, ponder a little about what South Africans - not just Luthuli 
House ideologues - want. They want leadership and not some endless we-
must-debate crap. He must be bold enough to tell his friends and supporters to 
go and jump and be able to embrace his opponents and have tea with his 
enemies. 
 
What Monare (2009) sets out is what most commentators and journalists think is 
required – if you deem yourself a leader, then you must show certain actions or ideas 
and then we will believe you know how to lead.  
 
For Ndlangisa in 2007, leading meant having clear policies that will solve problems 
and gaining or seeking supporters along the way to implement your programme 
(Ndlangisa, What the Zumafesto holds, 2007). But you can only do that with the help 
and support of the collective within your organization or cabinet, according to 
Oliphant (2007). Additionally, when you are new leader you must bring renewal but 
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keep in mind your predecessors successes and failures, said Malusi Gigaba, then 
deputy minister of Home Affairs:  
 
Zuma represents a new experience in leadership. He must introduce freshness 
in leading the ANC, the tripartite alliance and South Africa. He must do things 
anew, while not departing from how his predecessors have led the ANC and 
held its banner aloft (Gigaba, 2008).  
 
But one of Zuma’s most vociferous critics, Paul Hoffman, an advocate, says it is key 
to lead with accountability, responsibility and reason. Otherwise, if this is not done, 
there is the risk of turning a country into a kleptocracy (Hoffman, 2009): 
 
A Zuma presidency would be "a dream shattered ... as South Africa turned 
into yet another post-colonial kleptocracy, another footprint of despair in the 
path of destruction away from the promises of uhuru. The core issues involve 
accountability. Zuma cannot pretend to be a mere deployee of his party: he is 
first and foremost an individual who is in a position in which he is obliged to 
comport himself responsibly, reasonably and in a manner responsive to the 
needs of the people. He cannot possibly properly run the complex, long-
overdue criminal trial in which his personal liberty is at stake, a trial that will 
keep him in Pietermaritzburg for months if not years, and discharge the 
responsibilities of head of state and head of the national executive in Cape 
Town and Pretoria at the same time (Hoffman, 2009).  
 
In a Mail and Guardian editorial in 2009, the newspaper’s view is that Zuma is a 
breath of fresh air and praises some of his traits. The editorial finds that it is good to 
be a leader that is consultative, consensus-seeking that listens but warns, afterwards it 
is also important to make decisions and have them accepted (Ubaba must lead, 2009):  
 
Jacob Zuma's consultative and consensus-seeking style, very much in 
evidence since he moved into the Union Buildings, is a welcome change. But 
an appreciation of the importance of consultation and conciliation should not 
mean that the president becomes paralysed between alternatives - his leftist 
allies, for example, and his grand vizier, Trevor Manuel. A president has to 
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listen, and when he is done listening he must be decisive and accountable 
(Ubaba must lead, 2009). 
 
In an article evaluating the first 100 days of the Zuma presidency, reporters 
Mmanaledi Mataboge and Glynnis Underhill spoke to various opposition party 
leaders about the milestone and the conclusion was that leading means placing 
substance over style and being the main decision-maker but also being 
accommodating (Mataboge & Underhill, 2009).  
 
Also leading means having good problem-solving skills, judgment and effectiveness 
but not for personal gain, according to Nic Dawes, then editor of the Mail and 
Guardian:   
 
It works like this: take a president anxious to consolidate his position ahead of 
a vote that will be decided by factional warfare, add an array of state security 
bodies packed with ANC deployeess whose first loyalty is not to the 
Constitution, or even the party, but to factional barons, then stir in large 
dollops of cash” (Dawes, Conspiracy stuck on repeat, 2011). On top of what 
Dawes outlines, ordinary people should sense that there is credibility, 
competence, principle and commitment in a leader when leading to build the 
confidence of citizens with a shared common cause (Smith, 2012). 
 
In addition, Weekend Argus Saturday editor, Chiara Carter said leaders need to be 
comfortable with tough expectations from citizens and what they believe a president 
ought to be like (Carter, Under the microscope: Zuma's first 100 days as ANC leader, 
2008): 
  
He faces tough expectations, not least because South Africans and the ANC 
tend to want a morality play - a noble movement, a miracle nation winning 
through and an iconic leader at home and on the world stage. Zuma's 
indisputable charm did not shield him from his own gaffes and these being 
seized on by his critics as a sign that the man who might well be the country's 
next president lacks a principled centre and instead plays at being all things to 
all people. Part of the motivation for the Polokwane coup was to effect a 
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return to collective leadership in the party and they are keen to see a 
mechanism that will ensure that the ANC speaks with a collective voice 
(Carter, Under the microscope: Zuma's first 100 days as ANC leader, 2008) 
 
And a very good trick, as a leader, is to appoint politically sophisticated and media 
savvy spokespeople who can engage with the media and put the leader’s views out 
there. This was contained in an editorial (Mac makes a comeback, 2011) in the Mail 
and Guardian in 2011, focusing of Zuma’s appointment of Mac Maharaj (a former 
minister in Mandela’s cabinet) as his presidential spokesman: 
 
If Zuma's motive in appointing Maharaj is also to reach out to the South 
African public, we approve. The heart of criticism against the president has 
been that he has failed to give leadership as he protects his political future by 
balancing interests within the alliance. The appointment also takes place in the 
context of increasingly acrimonious relations between the media and the 
government. In contrast with certain recent appointees, Maharaj is politically 
sophisticated and media savvy - and we hope that he will seek to bridge this 
widening gap (Mac makes a comeback, 2011).  
 
Pointedly, this section shows that what Monare says is universal in the news media, 
that a leader leads by being inspiring, respectable, reflective and implements his 
programme.   
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Evaluating Zuma’s stewardship  
 
The period between the ANC’s elective conferences in Polokwane in 2007 and 
Mangaung in 2012 is key to understanding President Jacob Zuma’s leadership in his 
early years as leader of the ANC and the country, and how he may be evaluated by 
history after he has left power. It would not be fair to speak of what the press believes 
about political leadership and the normative criteria they set out, without giving a 
report on Zuma himself as a leader of this country and the governing party using the 
very same news media.  
 
After Zuma’s election to the presidency, what kept journalists and commentators 
awake at night was whether he would meet the most basic expectations of his 
position. Also his history would play a central role in his evaluation. Therefore, this 
section looks at the expectations of Zuma’s presidency, his promises, results and 
evaluations by the media.  
 
Sipho Seepe, a political analyst in a debate in 2009 (in the City Press) with the then 
DA leader, Helen Zille said that Zuma faced heavy expectations and started his 
presidency on a difficult footing (Seepe, The sky did not fall, 2009). Seepe argued 
that disparate groupings who supported him and had him elected ANC president 
wanted different things from him when in power but he viewed this as a positive 
thing. Seepe said Zuma’s critics expected anarchy but they were proven wrong. This 
is similar thinking from Kribbs Naidu, also in 2009, who said that Zuma would make 
a great president if he received support (Naidu K. , 2009): 
 
Opposition leader Helen Zille has described Zuma as disarming and charming, 
a person difficult not to like. President Zuma displayed a remarkable 
shrewdness. He responded to the interests of his disparate constituencies and 
kept the alliance together while asserting the ANC as the strategic centre and 
leadership of the alliance. In doing so he displayed a mark of leadership by 
being humble enough to accept that others may hold a different view from his.  
But while his presidency has opened and democratised public debate, Zuma, 
as head of state and leader of the ANC, should address the vulgarity and 
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insults that are polluting this space. The pollution comes largely from the 
alliance partners. But far from the mayhem predicted by prophets of doom, our 
democracy remains intact and vibrant (Seepe, The sky did not fall, 2009). 
 
Another focus on expectations came from a 2009 editorial in the Sunday Independent 
saying that the expectations were created by the ANC and its leadership through 
promises, during the election campaign, ranging from increasing the pace of service 
delivery, fighting corruption, improving social services and reducing crime (Will 
Zuma fulfil voters' expectations?, 2009): 
 
These are expectations that Zuma created during his successful election 
campaign. The electorate absorbed these as promises and now they have 
become the key performance indicators of his job description - his contract 
with the people of South Africa. The big question is: Will he deliver? Zuma 
has a tough balancing act to perform. He has to find capable people while 
satisfying his critically important constituencies within the 
ANC/COSATU/SACP tripartite alliance. It will not be easy. However, he 
must be guided by one thing and one thing only - the interests of 46 million 
South Africans. And precisely because he has so much to prove, Zuma might 
turn out to be a great president for South Africa. We will wait and see (Will 
Zuma fulfil voters' expectations?, 2009). 
 
Moreover, journalist Edwin Naidu said Zuma was expected to be an action man and a 
headmaster who delivers. “Zuma will have to show he is not all talk but action 
because some ministers in the extended government he formed will inevitably fail,” 
(Naidu E. , 2009). Also Marcia Klein, a Sunday Times journalist, in an article 
published in 2008 prior to Zuma becoming president of South Africa, wrote that 
Zuma had promised to be a collective decision maker and tackle poverty, the 
economy and create an accountable government (Klein, 2008).  
 
With such expectations, Zuma’s promises came to the fore in an interview with 
Moshoeshoe Monare, then Independent Newspapers’ group political editor, with the 
president. Monare wrote that Zuma promised to have a different presidential style by 
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delegating and strengthening the deputy president’s role (Monare, Out with the 
loafers, in with women premiers - Zuma, 2009): 
 
Speaking to Independent Newspapers after charges against him [Zuma] were 
dropped, he spoke confidently and frankly about the shape, form and content 
of his presidency. Zuma promised drastic changes in the presidency, both in 
style and substance, saying his diary would ‘indicate that now it is a different 
person here’. ‘You should appreciate that I was in government.... There were 
things then, when I was there (that) I was not happy with. So I already have 
ideas. ‘I'm sure I know the loafers a great deal, so I will be able to deal with 
(them), but I also know people who work, and work hard.’ Zuma said although 
he would keep some staffers for continuity and institutional memory, he would 
hire people who pushed his agenda. ‘There should be a balance...of people 
who must carry the kind of culture that I want to bring into government. I want 
to remove the slow movement in government,’ he said. Zuma said he would 
not be a control freak, but would delegate and strengthen the office of the 
deputy president. While Thabo Mbeki was criticised for reducing his deputy 
presidents to ceremonial junior ministers, for Zuma a deputy president's role 
depends on ‘the style of the president’. ‘Does the president give his deputy an 
opportunity...to stretch himself or herself fully in the tasks? Are there specific 
tasks that are identified to be done by the deputy president? If you don't do 
that, the deputy president disappears. ‘So the deputy president needs to play a 
greater role...There is a lot that cannot be done by one man; you actually have 
to delegate,’ he said. Zuma reiterated that he would not appoint people simply 
because they had supported him in the succession battle. ‘I believe in the 
collective leadership...it will not just be me saying, "This individual is good’, 
he said (Monare, Out with the loafers, in with women premiers - Zuma, 2009).  
 
Also, journalist Deon de Lange, writing for the Sunday Independent, said that Zuma 
had promised to be decisive and not allow opposition (De Lange, 2009). 
 
ANC MPs and members of provincial legislatures (MPLs) elected this year 
will have to shape up or ship out - no matter what friendships get ruined in the 
process - Jacob Zuma, the party leader, told delegates at its national list 
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conference in Kempton Park yesterday. Zuma warned that underperforming 
public representatives would not last long before being replaced by ‘people 
who can do the job’. ‘I don't think we should tolerate comrades who do not 
deliver simply because we elected them. We will take action ... People don't 
say:  'So-and-so has failed,' they say: 'the, ANC has failed',’ he said to 
applause from about 400 delegates'. He threatened ‘comradely but firm’ action 
against those who did not ‘work tirelessly to deliver services to our people’. 
Zuma also appealed to candidates to view their nomination as a service to 
citizens and not simply as a job (De Lange, 2009). 
 
So how did Zuma perform? The mostly negative evaluations and some positive 
aspects, paint a complex and nuanced picture of a man who knew how to use power 
when he wanted to but also someone who could become mysterious. Lindiwe 
Mazibuko, the leader of the official opposition in the National Assembly in 2012 said, 
simply, Zuma was a bad leader who had failed South Africa (Mazibuko, Time to 
govern without re-election pressure, 2012). Moreover, Mail and Guardian journalists, 
Michelle Pietersen and Matuma Letsoalo quoted Julius Malema, the then expelled 
ANC Youth League leader, as saying Zuma was a limited leader who could not think 
(Pietersen & Letsoalo, 2012):  
 
South Africa is suffering a crisis of leadership. In these difficult days, we want 
the president to give the nation hope to overcome despair. Yet he has failed to 
match the power of his office with a sense of purpose. The president has 
fulfilled his statutory responsibility to present the presidency's budget, but his 
speech lacked leadership and vision. The president has failed to demonstrate 
leadership in the worst-ever global recession. The failure of leadership is 
causing havoc on the "frontline" of the economy - where real people live. In 
times past, citizens looked to the president to propose bold solutions to big 
problems. Their faith has been shaken and the president must restore it by 
showing leadership. If the president seeks to define a vision, he will need to 
reacquaint himself with the foundational bedrock of the republic: The 
Constitution and its Bill of Rights. The president has time and time again 
failed the constitutional test of accountability on which our entire system of 
government is built. I would like to ask the president: does doing what is right 
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simply because it is right play any role in the matrix of the government 
anymore? Does the presidency strive to create a culture of accountability in 
which public officials are the servants and the people the masters? The 
president presides over a sinister, secret "state within the state", at the apex of 
which he stands. His problem is that he constantly has to reshuffle the security 
services like a deck of cards to stay on top. The president's indecision extends 
to international relations and foreign policy. Our president must be the first 
head of state in history to fly to the United Nations in New York with three 
jets - and not one foreign policy brief among them. He is unable to drive 
policy that runs counter to the interests of the disparate factions that brought 
him to power. He will never be able to stamp his authority on his government 
because these factions do not share a common purpose (Mazibuko, Time to 
govern without re-election pressure, 2012). 
 
Although Mazibuko was disillusioned in 2012, in 2009, the political analyst William 
Gumede saw the future repeating the past. Gumede (2009) said Zuma had adopted 
Mbeki’s vices when he attained power – he would become an autocrat in power and 
his history would come back to haunt the country: 
 
Zuma successfully portrayed himself as "poor" identifying his personal 
marginalisation by former president Thabo Mbeki with the marginalisation of 
the poverty-stricken masses. He successfully distanced himself from the 
failures of the ANC government in the minds of poor voters, blaming them on 
Mbeki. Throughout the election campaign, his strategists portrayed his camp, 
which now dominates the ANC, as an almost different party. They projected 
Zuma and the new leadership as more pro-poor and democratic - and 
paradoxically less corrupt - suggesting they will offer effective government. 
To capture the top office, he has assembled a disparate coalition by promising 
every group what it wants to hear. Often the pledges are contradictory and 
some of his supporters are heading for disappointment; His initial response to 
these pressures is not encouraging. Not yet, formally in power, he has copied 
many vices of the Mbeki era from which he has distanced himself (Gumede, 
2009). 
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Thabedi (2010) in a letter to the Mail and Guardian, describes Zuma as a feudalist 
and fully fledged capitalist, thereby disappointing on some on his promises to 
supporters (especially the socialists) who brought him to power.  
 
Every member of his family over 18, and his wives and girlfriends, are in 
business. Zuma is a polygamist and a playboy, practices that are anti-
communist. Rather, he is our South African tsar (Thabedi, 2010). 
 
Other negative aspects include Zuma appointing ‘lackeys’ to key positions of power 
and shutting down debate, according to an unnamed critic from the Gauteng ANC 
(Letsoalo & Molele, Gauteng executive sharply critical of Zuma, 2012). Besides, 
Sefara says these supporters are blindly loyal and eager to defend the president no 
matter how foolish he makes them look (Sefara, 'Heroes' at the dinner table, 2010). 
On the other hand, Ngalwa (2010) says Zuma underestimated the task of governance 
and taking leadership responsibility (Ngalwa, Zuma: is the centre holding?, 2010): 
 
After all the hurdles for Jacob Zuma to become president had been cleared, 
there was an implicit national consensus to give him a chance. Even the 
venomous opposition was charmed. The media were captivated by his 
newfound presidential demeanour, a cartoonist even shelved the satiric 
shower. The tone of his inauguration speech was warm and reassuringly 
reconciliatory, especially coming from a man whose road to the presidency 
had been rocky. He confounded the prophets of doom, mostly in his own 
party. A small section of his organisation did everything in its power to stop 
him - citing the paucity of probity and dearth of intellect as a basis to reject 
him. Zuma and his supporters - or those who fought in is trenches - 
underestimated the mammoth task of governance and responsibility of 
leadership (Ngalwa, Zuma: is the centre holding?, 2010). 
 
Also, an editorial by the Sunday Independent took issue with Zuma’s actions and 
described him as muddling along with no clear purpose, when it came to policy 
surrounding government-owned companies due to: 
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…a lack of decisive leadership on his [Zuma] part now seems to be putting the 
chances of greater efficiency to risk. No clearer example of this can be found 
than in the fraught arena of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). What is needed is 
a sense of clear purpose, united behind the goal of a proper framework 
harnessing SOEs. Instead, there is more confusion - layered on the muddle that 
has dragged on for years ...treating a symptom without dealing with the cause: 
the lack of political leadership from the centre (Zuma's clear vision needed, 
2010). 
 
Tellingly, by 2010, an editorial by the Sunday Independent showed growing 
disappointment and came to the conclusion that Zuma did not care about public 
opinion after all. Zuma had only hit the right notes at the beginning of his presidency 
because that is what is done by any newly elected leader (Not another Jansen moment 
please, Mr Prez, 2010):  
 
The occasion was his inauguration [May 10] at the Union Buildings where the 
world watched and nodded. The renewal Zuma spoke of related to his 
approach and content of his leadership. His was a return to reconciliation. The 
following day, he announced a cabinet that was difficult to find fault with. As 
the script goes, he did many other good things to silence those who thought 
the country was about to fall apart on his watch. No sooner had Zuma's critics 
started eating humble pie did he start showing signs he cared little about 
public opinion by appointing questionable characters to his administration 
(Not another Jansen moment please, Mr Prez, 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, Monare, also in 2010, said that in actuality Zuma knew how to use 
power and made important decisions with far-reaching negative consequences 
(Monare, Criticism of Zuma is evidence of democracy, not conspiracy, 2010):  
 
Is Kodwa [presidential spokesman] suggesting that one has to flirt with Zuma 
before one is allowed to comment on him? Zuma is not attractive anyway. If 
some editors don't like Zuma, so what? And why should they? He was elected 
to govern - not to be pitied and hugged. Zuma contested power and won it, by 
a popular vote last year. It was not a beauty pageant. Why should he and his 
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aides be frightened by columnist or, commentators? He is not a victim. He 
doesn't deserve pity. He is one of the most powerful men in the world, leading 
Africa's biggest economy and representing the continent on world forums. His 
decisions and actions could shake the whole continent. Zuma also played' the 
role of the victim when there were attempts to prosecute him and when Thabo 
Mbeki ejected him from government. Miraculously, his fortunes changed - 
Mbeki was ousted and Zuma became president of the ANC and the country. 
That's someone who knows how and when to use power. Zuma is not a moron. 
He and Kodwa must now stop this bull about Zuma being persecuted. But the 
danger with this argument is that he and his boss – and some of his colleagues 
- might actually believe in this conspiracy theory nonsense, become vindictive 
and hunt "enemies of the state". The previous administration used similar 
reasoning. Does Kodwa expect the media to ignore a major scandal about the 
president days before the state of the nation address? Does he expect the 
media not to analyse the substance of the blandest and most boring speech of 
20l0? Maybe he should direct his frustration to his principal - an intriguing, 
colourful subject of gossip and trivia (Monare, Criticism of Zuma is evidence 
of democracy, not conspiracy, 2010).  
  
Tied to Monare’s view that Zuma knew how to use power, columnist and broadcaster, 
Redi Tlhabi said in 2011, Zuma led when it was convenient to protect himself and 
account to the public when he had no choice (Tlhabi, 2011) whilst Times Media 
editor, Phylicia Oppelt in 2012 described Zuma as being expedient in how he created 
Malema’s profile, had him go after critics and enemies and then discarded him when 
his creation turned on him (Oppelt, 2012). Tied to Tlhabi’s view is that Zuma was 
decisive and not pleasing everyone when he fired then key supporter and national 
police commissioner, Bheki Cele after accepting the Public Protector’s remedial 
action. But he also dropped the “lets-please-everyone approach to wield power the 
way he saw fit (Rossouw & Tabane, 2011).  
 
And in terms of how Zuma actually ran the country and his party, Sefara said the 
president was a spymaster who watched closely those around him and isolated his 
critics (Sefara, Zuma's cabinet reshuffle shows his political genius, 2010). Zwelinzima 
Vavi, then Cosatu general secretary and later an ex-supporter of Zuma was quoted by 
  
73  
journalist Carien du Plessis saying that the president had presided over a predatory 
state (Du Plessis, 2011) full of "hyenas", "tenderpreneurs", "ultra-leftists", and a 
"paralysis of leadership". In a 2011 letter to the Sunday Independent, Sefu Sekgala, a 
regular commentator said Zuma had run the country like an intern with a pendulum 
leadership style (Sekgala, 2011) whilst political scientist Mzukisi Qobo, simply saw it 
as Zuma’s presidency damaging South Africa’s institutions (Qobo, 2011) and a 
Sunday Times editorial described it as Zuma killing institutions for his own 
enrichment agenda ( A trickle of justice against the tide, 2011). Njabulo Ndebele, the 
writer and former University of Cape Town vice-chancellor, said Zuma’s conduct 
showed he had disdain for the Constitution through allowing the erosion of 
institutions and allowing corruption to flourish (Ndebele, 2012):  
 
One reason South Africa is deprived of credible political leadership is that the 
very process of selecting political leadership is not designed to reward 
excellence. Leadership succession is determined through the dictatorship of 
the party over society. It is for the reason that the wall of mystery surrounding 
leadership within the ANC should be assailed to allow for a more open 
discussion on South Africa's leadership options and the possible directions the 
country should take beyond Jacob Zuma's presidency. The first is that the 
character of political leadership has a powerful impact on the nature of the 
country's institutions and the quality of its future - politically, morally and 
economically. There is little doubt that for the foreseeable future the ANC will 
continue to dominate the South African political landscape and act as a party 
that produces presidents for the nation - however flawed these may be. The 
consequences of morally and intellectually defective leadership could be 
extremely damaging and difficult to reverse. Zuma became president simply 
because his faction had its way. His slate was more popular to those who 
either falsely saw in him an image of a messiah, or an avenue through which 
they could access power and plunder state resources. Zuma's rise to power was 
very much facilitated by a deadly cocktail of political manoeuvring and 
illegality, including the use of illegally obtained spy tapes to get him off the 
hook and to pave the way for his rise to the Union Buildings. He came to 
power with no credibility to stand on. As such, the office of the president 
lacked decorum (Qobo, 2011). 
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Additionally, Zuma was accused, in a Mail and Guardian editorial, that he made 
decisions without following ethics and rules (Measure of performance, 2011):  
 
South African Cabinet ministers are almost never fired for incompetence or 
ethical lapses - Zuma's October reshuffle had more to do with politics than 
probity. So, if he does get rid of the minister of expensive hotel suites, it will 
set a welcome and praiseworthy precedent. So if Zuma really wants to 
demonstrate his performance monitoring bona fides he should rid himself of 
his turbulent Police Commissioner, Bheki Cele, the public works minister, 
Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde, who is also up to her neck in a scandal over the 
procurement of buildings… (Measure of performance, 2011). 
 
Although most evaluations of Zuma are negative, there were some commentators who 
had positive things to say.  
 
On policy areas, Obed Bapela the deputy minister of the Department of Performance, 
Monitoring and Evaluation (in the Presidency) wrote in the City Press that Zuma had 
shown a steadfast hand on areas such as HIV/AIDS, infrastructure and planning 
(Bapela, 2012): 
 
To change our path on HIV, it took strong and decisive leadership. A country 
once derided for its HIV policies is now acknowledged as a world leader. This 
is thanks to the decisive leadership of President Zuma. Neither of these plans 
[the NDP, NGP] would have become a reality without the steadfast leadership 
of President Zuma. At their core both visions are about creating jobs, building 
infrastructure to stimulate economic growth and providing opportunities for all 
(Bapela, 2012).  
 
For Karima Brown, a seasoned journalist and commentator, Zuma showed he was not 
afraid to admit his mistakes and also understood governing to be a process and made 
decisions accordingly (Brown K. , 2010) when reshuffled his cabinet: 
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Last Sunday’s Cabinet reshuffle is the most explicit articulation of the 
character of the Jacob Zuma presidency - and of the Zuma view of the 
country's future - before or since the ruling party's Polokwane watershed. 
Zuma has shown us parts of his vision and his way of working since 
Polokwane. This past Sunday, he gave us the whole enchilada. Possibly the 
most important message the president gave the country was that he - unlike his 
predecessor - had no problem admitting his mistakes, or recognising that the 
construction of a government was a process, not an event - a work in progress 
requiring constant refinement. We saw this with his dismissal of ministers 
historically close to him (Brown K. , 2010). 
 
Likewise, Brown in an evaluation in 2013, said Zuma had succeeded in holding the 
ANC’s national executive committee together under his lead and shaping it (Brown 
K. , 2013). A similar recognition was made by Zweli Mkhize, then KwaZulu-Natal 
premier and ANC provincial chairman, that the president achieved ANC membership 
growth, good relations in alliance and NDP (Shoba, 2012):  
 
Yes, individual leaders play a role shaping the party's identity, but the ANC 
trumps individual profile. Zuma is firmly in charge of his party with the added 
bonus of state power. Zuma's support in the ANC is also not confined to one 
ideological school wing. He has support among nationalists and the left. For 
all Zuma's flaws, it is under his leadership that the NEC broadly reflects a 
cross section of leaders from various orientations. This allows Zuma to 
reconstitute the ANC's centre that has come under threat in the factional 
battles in the party. While many see speedy action as a sound leadership 
quality, in the ANC, it is a leader's ability to wait and have patience that yields 
the most dividends (Brown K. , 2013). 
 
Finally, Zuma’s stewardship of the country and his party, has had more to do with 
expectations in the news media that were not fulfilled and his reputation suffered but 
there were some commentators who saw a president who was a smart operator, who 
was able to keep his party’s support through many damaging scandals who did not 
conform to the ideas prevalent in society. On whether he is a successful leader, most 
in the news media would say he failed and only with posterity we will see a clearer 
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view after Zuma leaves office. This goes some way to understand what was reported, 
who wrote opinion pieces in that time and some observations on key media actors are 
in the next section.  
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Observations on the reporting and opinion by key writers 
 
Overall reporting focused on major events such as the political parties’ conferences or 
major state speeches such as the opening of Parliament. A lot of the opinions in the 
newspapers seem to emanate from critics and followers within the party, government 
sources but an interpretation is that the reporters speak to people they are most 
comfortable with and “are their allies”, who feed them information all the time in 
return for their perspective to come through in the media.  
 
The City Press tended to focus on alliance dynamics and ANC internal movements 
and fights among factions and individuals in the NEC and government and what they 
were doing. It was taken as a fait accompli that Zuma was not a good leader and 
instead the debates were amongst letter writers and columnists and criticising each 
other. 
 
On the other hand, the Mail and Guardian did not really focus very specifically on the 
leadership of Zuma, but on those around Zuma, court cases, information wars and 
propaganda. There was focus on ethics in how Zuma operated and the party he leads. 
In 2011/12 the focus moved strongly towards Malema and his acolytes. Strong use 
was made of unnamed sources but those who could have assumed to be close to 
powerbrokers or those directly involved such as Zuma, implying that Mail and 
Guardian journalists have their ears close to power. In most articles, there is emphasis 
on the politics of the ANC and state and there are moments when policy is mentioned 
but not drilled into much, the assumption was that the reader already knew. Some 
journalists seem surprised that politicians including Zuma would play games to have 
an edge in power (there is a false sense of innocence in being part of the media – “oh 
but how could they do this and that” – as if talking to politicians to get the latest 
salacious treat is not part of a game itself). In a July 2011 opinion piece “A national 
conversation driven by fear” by Rapule Tabane, he implicitly admits media is in the 
“great game” of pushing its own agenda when it comes to evaluating leaders. 
(Tabane, Mail and Guardian, 2011).  
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There was also a lot of coverage of those who oppose Zuma within the ANC and what 
they were doing, saying and much of their criticism. The newspaper also allowed pro-
Zuma proxies and the opposition to debate within the pages of the paper but more 
emphasis was on those who were against Zuma prior to Mangaung. Zuma is also 
covered (Twala, 2012) many times talking about organisational unity and discipline 
with the Malema expulsion his biggest win yet. In addition, there is an emphasis on 
Zuma’s numbers game, charm and state resources to keep his team in place (Tabane, 
Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, there is less emphasis on Zuma’s leadership during various key periods 
(see the following work on court cases Davies-Laubscher, 2014; Khuluse, 2011 and 
Utting, 2011. On the Spear controversy (Egglestone, 2014 ). The relationship between 
media and ANC leaders (Daniels, 2012), the Arms Deal (Rague, 2010) and (Camerer, 
2009) and control of the ANC (Southall, Zuma: party leadership as electoral liability, 
2014)). 
 
In the Sunday Independent, writers seem to have taken nuanced views of Zuma, 
arguing for and against. There was focus on followers of Zuma and what they wanted 
and whether Zuma had delivered or not. The Sunday Independent writers were fair to 
Zuma when he ascended the presidency and their analysis started from looking at 
what Zuma faced, his promises and what he did to get them done. There was doubt in 
some columnists’ minds but they tried to be balanced reflecting the views of people 
within the ANC, tripartite alliance and in government. Zuma, earlier in his presidency 
was interviewed and his voice was allowed to come through (even via his 
spokespersons, advisors and supporters). However, critics were also given ample 
space to air their grievances.  
 
In the case of the Sunday Times, more focus was on Zuma on a personal level in its 
reporting and what he had been up to with more critical but nuanced opinion in the 
columns. Also there was a focus on his supporters and followers who would write in 
through opinion pieces or letters defending Zuma.   
 
Regular columnists from the Sunday Times such as Mondli Makhanya, Redi Thlabi, 
Phylicia Oppelt, and Stephen Mulholland were Zuma’s fiercest critics. Other critics 
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included opposition politicians such as Lindiwe Mazibuko and Helen Zille. But 
Zuma’s key defenders were Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande, former 
presidential spokesman, Mac Maharaj and COSATU president Sdumo Dlamini. In 
their opinion pieces, there was emphasis on not individualising leadership and 
focusing on collective leadership in the ANC. The key point was that there is almost 
no room for individual leadership – more cadre than leader. This also brought out the 
confusion amongst defenders on how the main leader leads but also cannot lead 
without the collective. Additionally, Zuma’s defenders would debate critics over 
Zuma’s leadership with the former emphasising that they “know Zuma better than you 
– this is what you don’t know about him”. 
 
Critics then tended to have low expectations and that the man had proven to be a bad 
leader as expected. In this case, over time, critics showed themselves to have never 
given Zuma a chance or they had a low bar for him in the first place. Zuma critics also 
received a lot of space in Sunday Times columns and in news article quotations – with 
a heavy emphasis on the negative.  
 
Finally, there was a tendency in the Sunday Times to write about an “unknown 
quantity” [Zuma] by comparison to what is supposed to be established leadership 
template [Mandela, Mbeki, Motlanthe, Obama, Churchill and others] in the world.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The emergent themes and ideas in the media representation of political leadership in 
South Africa show that the press in South Africa tends to represent political 
leadership and governance through a focus on the incumbent in leadership positions 
such as the presidency. This representation is further developed through focusing on 
the personality of the man or woman in charge, their history is important in how 
analysis takes place and their actions are paramount. There is also more focus on 
comparison to predecessors and other world leaders. In the case of Jacob Zuma, the 
focus went deeper into the past, from past ANC leaders to his predecessors such as 
Mandela and Mbeki and surprisingly even comparison to other international leaders 
such as Winston Churchill to Ronald Reagan who led their countries in vastly 
different circumstances.  
 
Therefore, media representation of leadership and how to lead is also dependent on 
normative positions that journalists and commentators see as key to leading the 
country or political party and the news media defines these norms or grasps at them 
by discussing how the incumbent leader is doing and whether he uses good or bad 
examples from the past or not. A key finding in the research above was that the press 
had low expectations of Zuma’s leadership in the first place, and there were pockets 
that thought to give him a chance but that quickly evaporated and the focus shifted to 
criticism of what he was not doing and some key writers felt he was a failed 
individual in the first place and had gone on to prove them right. But other 
commentators and supporters of Zuma felt he did some things correctly but these 
were the minority voices in the press. Also many key writers had their own notions of 
leadership, against which Zuma was measured and they advanced it into public 
discussion and that influenced the overall assessment of Zuma. 
 
But what became clearer later, was that the press did not have a specific definition of 
political leadership but the discussion was driven by an agreement that the best 
template so far of good leadership with results came from the Mandela period in the 
1990s. Additionally, there was much less discussion on how a leader leads the country 
or his organization and this discussion tended to go towards the traits needed to lead. 
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Therefore, the narratives in the press revolve around individual leaders and how they 
affect the system whether of party or state, implying that a leader can have a lot of 
power to shape the future of the country.  
 
Likewise, what emerges is that the discussion of leadership is fraught with 
assumptions and a lack of clarity. These norms then also tend to link to the idea of 
democracy as envisaged in the constitutional structure of power in the country but 
also these rules link to what the governing party, the ANC thinks of leadership and 
additionally and how the struggle for democracy was conducted during apartheid 
from a moral perspective.  
 
Finally, in the case of President Zuma, news media discussed the president as if he 
was only a state president of the country, an individual who lacked morality and 
vision and did everything outside of his political party, the ANC, implying that the 
party was innocent in wrongdoing. Nevertheless, this is mistaken because 
organisations mould leaders and they create cultures and this allows certain leaders to 
emerge, just as Zuma did in 2007 in Polokwane as ANC president. Another missing 
part was that news media discussion omitted that ANC organisational culture does not 
articulate a vision for the party, it is the collective leadership who do and this is 
explained by how Zuma always articulated himself as being a servant of the ANC and 
said he was doing what the bidding of the collective as the overall leader. But, of 
course that was also a way to absolve himself and political theory tells us that the 
main leader even in a collective does create a vision for their party and country 
regardless of whether it is successful or not and makes decisions without the 
collective.  
 
Eventually, in the words of Mondli Makhanya, the editor of City Press, the type of 
leader that South African news media value is a leader they can love, be proud of, one 
who is respectful, compassionate, politically astute and grounded and in many ways 
we are still hung up on the great Nelson Mandela, who was open about his flaws.  
 
Makhanya’s views further confirm my observation, whilst practising as a journalist 
that editors and broadly newspaper owners are very influential and actively seek to 
condition and influence politicians and ordinary folk alike on what is politics, 
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leadership and how it all works. In addition, Hall (1982, 64) said that news media 
does what it does to continue to underwrite systematically a set of predominant 
values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures, that is, the rules of the game. The 
media determines what society knows in cahoots with those in power because it is 
reliant on those in power and in turn has to be part of the power structure to stay 
relevant and that is how media representation of political leadership takes place (Hall, 
1982).  
 
Therefore, the news media in South Africa in some way stuck to the classic definition 
of political leadership and assessed Zuma on his dignity, office, his position as leader, 
especially of the country; his ability to lead; his personality; his followers and 
supporters; and  his direction of the government and party (Oxford English Dictionary 
(2016) ; Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight (2013)). 
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